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THE CALL TO THE MINISTRY¹

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THE most important question which a man has to decide in this world is that of his work in life. The majority of men must settle this problem in the light of conscience and common sense, their knowledge of their world, what can be done and what needs to be done in the world, and their knowledge of themselves, their natural inclinations and abilities.

The broad initial option lies between business and the professions. The opportunities in the business world are perfectly apparent. There is above all else the zest of the great game, so dear to the strenuous temper of America. The prospects for a successful, absorbing, and useful life-work in business or industry are so clear that such a career needs no advocates. It should merely be noted, however, that although the single individual may enter business with a social conscience and with altruistic motives and plans, he finds himself in a world that is primarily operated with a view to private gain.

The claim of the four major professions — the law, medicine, teaching, and the ministry — rests upon an entirely different premise. The professional man enjoys certain social recognitions and privileges in modern society which are not accorded the business man. And although, man for man, the broker or banker is often a more high-minded person than the doctor or teacher, it still remains true that the professions as a whole have a certain moral rating of their own, which is in advance of the moral rating of the ranks of trade and industry.

The reason for this felt and recognized distinction is clear and valid. The members of every great profession are organ-

¹ The Dudleian Lecture, given at the Harvard Union, May 1, 1922.

ized primarily around the principle of service. Let me quote from a Balliol don at Oxford, on this basic distinction between the status of the business man and that of the professional man:

A profession may be defined most simply as a trade which is organized, incompletely, no doubt, but genuinely, for the performance of function. It is a body of men who carry on their work in accordance with rules designed to enforce certain standards both for the better protection of its members and for the better service of the public. All professions have some rules which protect the interests of the community. The rules themselves may sometimes appear to the layman arbitrary and ill-conceived. But their object is clear. It is to impose on the profession itself the obligation of maintaining the quality of service, and to prevent its common purpose being frustrated through the undue influence of the motive of pecuniary gain upon the necessities or cupidity of the individual. The difference between industry, as it exists today, and a profession is, then, simple and unmistakable. The former is organized for the protection of rights, mainly rights to pecuniary gain. The latter is organized, imperfectly indeed, but none the less genuinely, for the performance of duties.¹

Every profession seeks to safeguard its own standard by two sets of requirements. The first demands the fulfilment of an initial training and discipline. The second requires subsequent conformity to the ethics of the profession. In the practice of our modern professions candidly commercial, competitive, and gainful practices which would pass unnoticed and unrebuked in industry, trade, or politics, are prohibited and disciplined. Professional men, for example, are tacitly prohibited from advertising. They are not expected to prescribe courses of conduct or treatment for their clients in which they themselves have a prospective money interest. Such actions are reckoned as "unprofessional conduct," and lay their author open to discipline by the profession as a whole, or in the extreme instance to dismissal from the profession altogether.

Nothing gives us greater cause for hope as to our world, at a time when optimism is neither cheap nor easy, than the steadily rising standards of initial professional requirement and subsequent professional practice. We live at a time in the world's history when most of the currencies of idealism have been debased, either by paper inflation without reference to hard facts, or by disillusionment and cynicism. It means very much

¹ R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*.

to any man to find at hand a way of life where moral ideals are not only still recognized, but where they are more than holding their own. It takes more of a man and a better man today to practise a modern profession than it ever took before. This means that the professions as a whole hold out a welcome and an increasing opportunity to the man who chooses a life-work guided primarily by the unselfish desire to be of service to his world.

We are concerned in this lecture with a single one of the major professions, that of the Christian ministry. It is the least understood and the least often claimed of the "Big Four." The choice of any one of the other three professions no longer implies indifference to religion or neglect of religion. And the choice of the ministry no longer assures a monopoly of religious purpose and privilege. Teaching, medicine, and law rest today upon certain fundamental moral premises and open certain concrete religious opportunities, which make of them all ministries in a very real degree. They have pre-empted many duties that once fell to the ministry alone. And it is impossible to say just where the work of the modern doctor, teacher, and lawyer ends and that of the minister begins. I came away one night from a hospital room with a surgeon who had been making a losing fight for the life of a patient, and who turned away knowing that he had lost. I asked him what he thought was in store for that girl who would cross the border before morning. He said, "I do not know. That is your business. Our professions do not overlap. You enter the room when I go out, and we meet at the door in passing, that is all." Most doctors would feel that while this was a severely scientific interpretation of the practice of surgery, it was not fully human, and that it was not true to the best traditions of the profession. But it represents, perhaps, the broad initial distinction between the realm in which the minister practises and the realms occupied by members of the other professions. They deal with the world of known facts, primarily. The minister deals with the marginal world of the unknown. They practise in the world of seen things already staked out and possessed by knowledge. He ventures by those intuitions which we call

faith, into realms of which we have no certain knowledge, and yet which concern us quite as truly as the colonies of the human mind conquered and administered by scientific certainty.

It is this initial difficulty of defining accurately the distinctive duties of the minister which makes the call to the ministry to young men of today a vague and casual call. The first question about the ministry to be stated and answered is, therefore, a very concrete one, "What has a minister to do in the modern world?" The duties of a Christian minister are twofold. They always have been twofold and they always will be. They consist of his public ministry and his private pastoral work in a parish. Both of these duties must be generously interpreted. The first includes the conduct of worship, the administration of sacraments, where they are observed, and preaching. It also extends out into the community at large, where the minister is expected to appear and to stand on countless public occasions as the recognized spokesman for one of the major concerns of human life, namely, religion. And after all, as Huxley used to say, there are only two things permanently worth bothering about in this life, religion and politics. In the pastoral relationship the minister's parish begins by making him the guide, philosopher, and friend of a certain limited number of human beings, and ends by making him a kind of social engineer concerned with the general human problem of his city or town.

It is widely felt, today, that these duties are more or less superfluous, and that the ministry is in danger of degenerating into a parasitic order, fattening off the community, but putting nothing back into the community. This feeling is very strong with the outspoken economic radicals. And it is vaguely felt by all those to whom the material goods are the most real values, and who wonder what religion is all about. Of what good is the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper? That is a hard question to answer. It can best be answered by asking another question, Of what good is any symbol and symbolic act? Of what good is guard-mount, and a flag, and a sunset gun? As to the work of preaching the minister no longer enjoys a monopoly of culture and learning as he did in earlier days. He does

not speak with the authority that once he did, either as the voice of a finally and completely revealed religion or as the principal possessor in his community of human learning.

His predicament has been honestly and accurately stated by a modern essayist:

No mariner ever enters upon a more uncharted sea than does the average human being born into the twentieth century. Our ancestors thought they knew their way from birth through all eternity: we are puzzled about the day after tomorrow. Ministers are as bewildered as the rest of us, perhaps a little more so. For they are expected to stand up every week and interpret human life in a way that will vitalize human conduct. To ask the clergy to find adequate meaning in this era is to expect each minister to be an inspired thinker.

The major problems of the modern ministry rest on the fact that the minister is primarily concerned with those aspects of human life which are at once the most important and yet the most difficult to define and to appraise. Just as a man's property at any moment is divided into tangible assets which can be realized at a moment's notice, and the intangibles which he cannot get his hand on for the time being, so a man's experiences divide themselves into the tangibles and the intangibles. Most of our work-a-day life is concerned with the tangibles. Religion is primarily concerned with the intangible. And the initial difficulty which religion has to face in modern America is the plain fact that the average man is impatient of the unseen and the intangible and inclined for the sake of efficiency to commit himself in his life's interest and work to the world of tangible facts and values.

The appeal of medicine, for example, as against the ministry, at the present moment is the appeal of a life of service in the tangibles as against a life of service with the intangible. A surgeon cuts out a malignant growth from the body cavity. If he is a normally trained man he knows what he is doing at every turn of the operation, and when he has finished he knows exactly what has been done. And the patient either recovers or dies. The surgeon can check himself up day by day, because his problems, though often obscure and always delicate, are also tangible. But the minister preaches a sermon or

talks with some one in trouble, and he never knows just what he achieves. For the world in which he works is not one that can be measured with a watch or a micrometer or a yardstick or scales. He is speaking to men's points of view, their tempers of life, their hopes and fears. But this does not mean that he is not dealing with a real world, only that its realities are too subtle to be appraised with the more obvious aspects of experience.

And this does not mean that the intangibles are not important; on the whole the more important aspect of life. A grim bit of literary realism came out of the war, a few years gone, in which there was a painfully vivid account of a hand-to-hand bayonet encounter. One of the combatants finally succeeded in driving his bayonet through the body of the other. "All of a sudden," runs the record, "the adversary's face turned absolutely smooth, as if the cold iron in his body had chilled his fury, his eyes opened wide in astonishment, and he looked at me as if to ask in reproach, 'What are you doing?'"

Some such expression as just that, of almost childish perplexity, is to be seen on the face of our time. It is no answer to say crudely, "I am driving a bayonet through you." That is an obvious and gratuitous insult. The answer to that question in all of its aspects lies in the realm of ideas and moral values. Nor are the answers of a narrowly materialistic social service to such questions any more satisfactory than the answers of candidly brutal materialism on a battle field. For, as a fine-tempered modern Englishman has said of much of the humane work of the time, "When everybody is properly housed and clothed and fed, the problem still remains what to do with life, a problem to which they have no answer to whom philanthropy is all of life."

Now the whole significance of religion in history and in human experience lies in the fact that it attempts to answer just that type of question. "What are you doing with life — your own life and that of the other man?" Religion has very little meaning or worth to the man who does not feel the urgency of problems like that. Apart from such an interest it may be a pleasant incidental decoration for living, one of the luxury-

trades that is sanctioned with good-humored tolerance. But it is not a matter of vital concern to the man who really does not care what he is doing with his own life, or what he is doing to the other man. But to those who do care about these matters, because somehow they have to care in spite of themselves when it would be easier and perhaps pleasanter not to care, religion becomes more and more imperative and inevitable because it is pledged not to stop short of final answers.

Now the ministry is a profession which is concerned with discovering and stating adequate working answers to these final questions of life. It has no monopoly of these interests as against the rights of other men to care and think about these things. But it is a life-work devoted to the study of these matters at first hand, as they arise in a man's own life and in that human laboratory which is his parish. It really has no other reason for existence. And everything it says and does, not only with its lips but in its life, ought to be a suggested answer to problems of that nature.

What constitutes a "call to the ministry"? It is no mystical voice or emotional urge merely. It is above all else, at the present moment, the inner necessity which a man finds laid hard upon him to get, first of all, some answer to these problems in his own life. And this call is not primarily a call from a church, or from a creed. It is the imperious moral command of circumstance. It is the voice of God speaking to his own reasonable conscience. It is the necessity he feels to find out why he is here, what it all means, and what he ought to do. Beyond that it is the call of troubled and perplexed human beings round about, asking for help in living, at the point where help is hardest to find, and yet when found means the most, the kind of help that comes from our deepest companionships in human experience. And any man who feels this necessity and hears these human voices has a sufficient call to the ministry.

If we were to recast the conception of the ministry in the familiar terms of present-day life, we might say that the modern minister is a research worker set aside by preoccupied men to study the realm of human motives and human values, and to venture fresh answers to the question, "What are we doing

with life?" Ultimately, he is the man who is trying to win the power and to give others the power to say "God" in all the experiences of life. History, in the fortunes of its great systems of thought, conduct, and organized social life, reveals a good many ways of saying "God." The minister must know the world's ways of saying "God" in broad outline, and must be prepared to reinterpret them in the light of present conditions. But the dead hand can never guide the living present. And no minister seeks simply to lay the dead hand on the perplexed living. He takes his start, not from the authority of the past, but from the perplexity and need of his own life and his own time. He cannot escape the thought with which Lord Bryce concluded his long study of democracy: "The civilized peoples seem to be passing into an unpredicted phase of thought and life." And he realizes that the letter of old creeds will not be able to make that transition. Old answers to the riddle of life can never entirely satisfy new conditions. And the minister today is the research worker set aside to deal with the fundamental questions of human values and human duties in the terms in which they state themselves in this new time.

Many a man who feels the pressure of these questions, and who recognizes the call to the ministry which they bring to him, will wonder whether he is qualified to enter the ministry. College men are confused about what they believe today, and painfully conscious of the fact that their creed is a brief and imperfect one as measured by the standards of conventional and orthodox theology. They hesitate to put themselves in a false position by entering a profession which seems to commit them to more than they can believe or accept. What constitutes theological qualification for entering the ministry under such conditions?

It seems to me perfectly clear that two broad convictions warrant a man in entering the ministry. The first conviction is this, that religion holds a better promise of satisfactory answers to the riddle of life than any other human interest. And the second more or less follows from it, that Christianity is the best and most adequate religion the world has thus far known. This is not sectarianism, nor orthodoxy. It is the

testimony of the common conscience. William James used to say that Christianity was the completest of the religions man has known. Josiah Royce called it man's most important glimpse of the homeland of the human soul. George Bernard Shaw adds, in characteristic vein, that although we crucified Christ on a stick two thousand years ago we have never been able to get away from the conviction that he got hold of the right end of that stick, and that if we were better men we might try his way. If a man is convinced of those two matters it seems to me he has entire and sufficient warrant for entering the Christian ministry in some church of his choice and preference. I cannot suppose that any man would think of entering the ministry with less of a creed than that. I do not believe that any church can well ask of a man at the beginning of his life more of a creed than that. Religion is the best answer to the final problems of life. And Christianity is the best religion that we know anything about as yet.

Now a good half of a minister's life is spent in preaching and getting ready to preach. And it is as a preacher that the minister is most characteristically known in the community. What is preaching today? It certainly is not re-echoing at second hand the thoughts of other men. And it is not thundering out old precepts and platitudes on the strength of a remote past.

Preaching at the present time is primarily a process of thinking aloud about life. It takes its start with the life of our own time, men's perplexities and needs. We have been told recently that the war discovered a vast fund of "inarticulate religion" in the rank and file of human life. Inarticulate religion is religion which has never really become conscious of itself, found itself, and got itself stated out in the open. The case for preaching at the present time rests on the inarticulate religion of the average man. A surgeon friend once said to me of his minister, "What really interests and helps me in that man is his ability to put into words what I have always wanted to say and have always felt ought to be said, and yet have never been able to say by myself. And that is a very great gift." That, after all, is what all art and every classic does for us. It says what we want to say and know ought to be said, and yet

cannot say ourselves. That is why pictures and music and plays have a power over us. They help us to find ourselves. And this is the first thing the modern preacher has to do, to help dumb and perplexed men say out what is in them. It is told of William James that the student came out of his classroom feeling not, What a great man James is, but, How great I might be, if I only knew myself and found myself. That was a fine tribute to a great teacher. Now good preaching gets just that reaction. In this fallen world the preacher cannot always be the clear voice of God twice every week. But he can always be the voice of the people, trying to find and express themselves.

✓ In the next place the preacher is trying to change men's point of view. And there is confessedly no hope for the future of civilization today, unless men's points of view are changed. There is no contribution which a man can possibly make to this generation so important and so absolutely essential as to help, even in the slightest way, to change men's way of thinking about the values of human life and the organization of human society. ✓ If our world is to be saved from suicidal disintegration it must discover afresh its communities of interest. And of all possible bonds of human union the thought of God is the surest and the strongest. Nothing so much needs to be said to the modern world as this, "One is your Father and all ye are brethren." ✓

Teaching mathematics, healing diseases, discovering the causes and cure of cancer, getting a more stable banking system, raising the level of court procedure, limiting armaments, and refining the rules of war are all important. But of themselves they fall short of the final thing which has to be done, if civilization is not to go down in ruins, and that is to change men's points of view. The trouble with our age is that in its purely mechanical and technical skill it has far outrun its social sciences and its moralities. An Oxford teacher said with utter truth that the catastrophe of the war was made possible by, and was due entirely to, our preoccupation with scientific and materialistic concerns, to the neglect of the humanities and the moral realities. And nothing that a man can possibly

do with his life today is to be compared with the chance he has to help change men's basic ways of thinking about life.

There are many young men who admit all this, and who are really anxious above all else to help change the world's ways of thinking. They believe that the one true God is the Father of Jesus of the gospels and that such a God can save the world. But they know that serving him means changing many of our ways of thinking and living. And they feel that the thing cannot be said by a minister from a pulpit because the plainest fact about churches is to be found in a line of that hymn which says, "Nothing changes here." In short they are afraid of orthodox theology, and of respectable conservative capitalism in the pews which they despair of ever making truly Christian. They are anxious to spend their lives doing what they think the ministry ought to do, but fear that churches do not offer them a chance to speak and act freely in the effort to change the world's way of thinking.

I can only report my own sober conclusions as to this absolutely vital matter. That men resent and resist the necessity for changing their ways of thinking and living is perfectly plain. Churches share in this temper, they have no monopoly of it. But the picture of the minister as a man whose soul is not his own and whose lips are sealed, living as the only remaining moral slave and coward in a world of otherwise absolutely free men is a grotesque caricature of the facts. If a man decides not to run away into a desert and live there forever in an easy and empty freedom, but to live in this world and to try to keep his own independence in the face of the stolid inertia of human institutions, liberty is costly everywhere, in the ministry or out of it. It is no easier to be a free man in the law or medicine or the teaching profession, in a bank or in the editorial room of a newspaper or in politics, than it is in the ministry. All things considered it may be harder, because the world does not expect of the layman quite that integrity that it expects, rightly or wrongly, from the minister. Do not think for a moment that merely because you have decided not to enter the ministry you have insured your moral self-respect and independence for the rest of your life.

The fight has only begun and the case will be fought out on other grounds where defeat is just as possible and perhaps even more probable.

My own observation is that if a man does not abuse his opportunities in a pulpit, to rant wildly at things as they are or to indulge in sentimental utopian pipe-dreams, but thinks soberly and with a generous and hopeful mind about the changes in men's ways of thinking and living that Christianity asks, there is no place where he is so free to say what he really believes as in a pulpit. He will meet opposition and criticism, it is true, but he does not escape them by keeping out of a pulpit. And somehow deep in the common conscience, beneath all superficial resentment and worldly opposition, there is the conviction that just that is what the Church is for — to change men's ways of thinking and living. A disgruntled parishioner once complained that Newman's preaching interfered with the way he did business. And Newman answered, "Sir, it is the business of the church to interfere with people." In the profoundest sense of the word that is true, and the world knows and silently admits it. Religion does interfere with life, radically and deliberately. But if that interference is made in the spirit of wisdom and charity, rather than of truculent abuse, I am prepared to defend the proposition that a man can call his soul his own in the ministry today and speak what is on his mind quite as freely from a liberal pulpit as from any other single point of vantage. Only, all this rests on the man's patent sincerity and humility and charity. Without these qualifications he will never be a free man in the ministry. But that is simply another way of saying that he would be a moral coward everywhere else.

Something of that sort, then, is the preaching work of the modern minister; to think aloud about life, so that he shall help perplexed men find themselves and say out through him what is in them, to the end that they may finally change their points of view and get new values for old in experience and in the organization of society — in short to make men believe that God is there, that he cares what they do, that he has a stake in them, and that "He must win the day."

There remains for final mention the other side of the minister's duty, that commonly called "parish work." This work at its broadest is always a piece of social engineering. It has to do with all the human and humane relationships of a community. It is an effort to tie up and enlist the resources of the members of a church for the effective service of the whole community through all of the organized philanthropic agencies. Parish administration is social service in the large, and concedes nothing to any of the secular social agencies. Hardly a day passes but a minister has to attempt to relate himself and his parish resources to the total social task of the community. Parish work, today, always involves finding contacts and outlets for a few hundred persons who ought to be seeking and helping their less fortunate fellow townsmen or citizens. Every minister is pledged in advance, both personally and as the commander of the time and money of other persons, to the major philanthropies of his community. He is seriously trying to organize his parish so that it can get to work at closer range and with greater effectiveness in the world at large, and in absolute coöperation with all the existing agencies.

But more definitely than all this the aim of parish work is simply to enable a man to know intimately and at first hand the lives and needs of all sorts and conditions of other men. There is a certain amount of dull routine drudgery to be done in the way of parish visiting. At its worst it is a matter of tea cups and small talk. I do not know that it is any duller or more dreary than a good deal of routine drudgery in a shop or an office or on a doctor's rounds. John's measles and Mary's lessons are just as much a dull routine to the doctor or the teacher as they are to the minister. It is drudgery, put it any way you will, and a wise man ends by accepting drudgery as an inevitable part of any serious life.

But the end and aim of all this drudgery is to enable a man to know the lives of other human beings in detail, so that he is in a position to help them when they really need help. Samuel Barnett, the pioneer social settlement worker who founded Toynbee Hall, said that the best work that was being done in East London in his time was done, not by the workers who

had broad impersonal schemes for social reform, but by those who were willing to take time and trouble with individuals. That is true of every profession and every piece of human service. The thing always comes down in the end to concrete human cases, and the solution is found not in sweeping programs or large generalities, but in a man's willingness to take time and trouble with individuals. A man will not be a good minister who is not willing to do this. But neither will he be a good doctor, or a good teacher, or a good lawyer. I am more and more impressed by the fact that, as this world goes, the most successful professional men, the men who stand clearly at the top of their calling, are the men who are willing to take time and trouble with individuals. Your good specialist in medicine always does this. And if he is not willing to do it, because he thinks he is too busy to pay that price, he will just miss success in his life-work.

Now that is what parish-work comes down to in the end. It is simply the willingness to take time and trouble with individuals, some inside a parish and others outside, who need that kind of help which religion brings to people who are in trouble. Those needs are, on the whole, the deepest and most imperative in human life. They are the needs of hope and courage and friendship and the willingness to go bravely on. Every minister is in duty bound to try to meet those needs, man to man and face to face. And preaching never takes priority over that kind of intimate, patient, hand-to-hand service of the world.

I think of a man who stumbled up to me the other night at the close of service. He had been wandering about the streets in the dark, had seen the lighted windows of the church, and had turned in there in the hope that he might find help. He did not ask for food or lodging or money. He said that he was on the verge of committing suicide and was afraid he would be driven to it before the night was over. And he wanted to find someone to stop him and save him. Is that emergency a trivial or fanciful one? No call that could ever be put to any man anywhere could be clearer or more imperious and challenging than the call of that frightened human life in its ex-

tremity. The kind of help that a minister ought to give, and can give, to such a need yields nothing, either in its reality or in the delicacy of its technique, to anything that a surgeon, or a lawyer, or a business man has to do to help this world.

The time comes, and comes frequently, in the life of the parish minister when he must enter the room that the doctor or surgeon has left because the art of healing can do no more, or when he is confronted with the angry and tangled problems of human relationships which have defied the solutions of the law, or when he must serve as the recipient of those confidences of the moral life which troubled human beings have to share with a friend. The work of the minister in these intimate and profoundly serious experiences yields absolutely nothing in its human importance or its human opportunity to the work of any other man. Superficially, parish work seems to the world a matter of trivial small talk, but actually it becomes, as a man's sympathies and insights develop, a patient grappling with those deepest and hardest problems of living which only religion can hope to solve. And the usually despised parish work of the average minister, when followed out to its ultimate conclusions, calls for the type of man who concedes nothing, either by way of opportunity or qualification, to any of his fellows in the great professions.

Of the compensations of the ministry it is difficult to speak, in advance of experience itself. A man may enter the ministry today, hoping to earn a competence through all his working years. If he is a man of real ability he will have no difficulty in assuring for his home margins of comfort. And he is entitled to the advance assurance that however laggard individual parishes may be, and however reluctant to advance ministerial salaries to meet advancing standards and rising prices, the Protestant churches as a whole are facing this problem seriously and propose to set their ministers beyond hardship and anxiety, both during their working years and in their old age. The ministry does not commend itself to those whose only interest in life is the lure of a large income. But less and less is it shutting out those who feel deeply their moral responsibility to provide adequate support for a home with all its normal

charges, and who are rightly unwilling to make the members of that home the victims of their inability to command a salary adequate for these needs. In short the average man does make a living in the ministry, and the more than average man receives a compensation which puts him beyond anxiety and assures him of normal provision for the needs of a family.

But the more abiding compensations of the ministry are to be reckoned among life's "intangibles." The ministry brings to every man who follows it loyally the double compensation that accrues to a life lived with great ideas and profound truths on the one hand and with concrete human needs on the other hand. And a life lived in the service of God and of one's fellow men is its own best reward, in its own coin.

RECENT TENDENCIES IN ROMAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY*

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I

CATHOLIC writers on Scholastic Theology do not hesitate to admit that no work contributing new and valuable additions to this science has been published since the days of Bellarmin, Suarez, and Lugo.¹ The collapse of scholastic philosophy after the fifteenth century could not fail to affect also scholastic theology, which in losing all contact with the new scientific progress lost also its strong appeal to speculative minds. Moreover, the Church, instructed by the events of the Reformation, had become so suspicious of novelties that any attempt to introduce new additions to the traditional teaching of theology was more likely to bring a thinker into the hands of the Inquisition than to lead towards a cardinal's hat.

But while it was possible for the theologians who taught in Catholic seminaries and convents to dwell undisturbed in their Christian Aristotelianism, this was impossible for those other theologians who, either by choice or by obedience, had to deal with apologetics, for apologetes must understand the spirit and speak the language of the times if their work is to have any value. Descartes greatly attracted the Catholic clergy in their search for a religious philosophy in harmony with the new times, but during the eighteenth century Locke and even Rousseau inspired many a manual of philosophy used as textbook in the ecclesiastical schools in preparation for the study of scholastic theology.²

Cartesianism however, even in the attractive form of Malebranche's intuitionism, was incapable of assimilation within the theological synthesis of the Tridentine scholastic tradition.³

* Full bibliographical notes will be found appended at the close of this article.

The cost of this break in the unity of philosophical and theological thought was paid by theology; incapable of either progress or regress, theology became almost a foreigner in the world of science and often a slave in the world of politics. As a matter of fact, in most European theological schools the text-books were imposed by royal decree in order to protect the state against dogmatic and canonical doctrines inspired by the principles of ultramontanist and pontifical autocracy.⁴ No wonder, then, that under these conditions the state of confusion, uncertainty, and ignorance in theological circles, as it is described by Lamennais at the beginning of the nineteenth century,⁵ was the worst that the history of modern Christianity can show.

The same influences which provoked in that period a rebirth of independent speculation among the Protestants, represented on one side by Schleiermacher's "Discourses" (1799) and on the other by Kant's "Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason" (1793), were at work also among Catholic theologians, and gave rise to the Traditionalism of the French and Italian schools, and to the Hermesism of the school of Bonn. Traditionalism, as represented in its early period by De Bonald and Lamennais, and later by Ventura and Bonnetty, was a legitimate child of the romanticist spirit; but later, especially in the case of Boutain and Ubaghs, was permeated by the ontologism of Rosmini, where it assumed a more definite philosophical aspect. It did not take long for the Church to realize that a system of religious philosophy which, starting from the assumption of a primitive revelation, denied more or less explicitly the capacity of human reason to reach by itself the elementary knowledge of God's existence, was not only entirely subversive of Thomistic intellectualism, but also by identifying revelation with nature, destroyed implicitly one of the corner-stones of Christian dogmatics, that is to say, the distinction between natural and supernatural order.⁶ Traditionalism could not escape condemnation. Its last refuge was the University of Louvain, where Ubaghs and his colleagues endeavored to prove that the Bible and the Fathers could and ought to be understood in a traditionalistic sense.⁷

Georg Hermes of the Catholic faculty of Bonn, on the other hand, turned frankly toward Kant and Hegel, and not only attempted a reinterpretation of Christian thought in terms of Kantian philosophy, but altogether a new systematization of theology. His point of departure was even more radical than that of Descartes, — the absolute practical doubt. The *pre-ambula fidei* were to him not only the door of entrance but the very essence of theology: faith, however, is based not on the value of speculative arguments, which are not cogent, but on the *obligatio credendi* induced by the practical reason. Hermes' "Christkatholische Dogmatik" was permeated throughout with Kantian rationalism, and fell under the weight of Roman censures.⁸

Nevertheless theological rationalism spread rapidly in the German Catholic schools, especially in the new synthesis made by Antonius Günther, priest of Vienna (1783–1863), who, looking away entirely from revelation, found in self-consciousness the basis not only of philosophy, but of the whole of Christian theology. Against the Hegelian assimilation of divine and human consciousness in the Absolute, which theologically led to undisguised pantheism, Günther maintained the dualism of traditional Christian theology, but denied the rational value of the old theology of exemplarism (of Platonic-Augustinian origin), as well as of the theology of analogy of the great scholastic doctors. The fundamental dogmas of the Church, like that of the trinity and the incarnation, are truths of which reason without the help of revelation may know the *raison d'être*. In this way both the divine and the human spirit concur as causes of the formation of dogmas, which, in so far as they depend upon the human spirit, are subject to progress and change. Günther's theological revolution attracted not only wide attention but large sympathy among Catholic thinkers, and even in Rome there was some hesitation before issuing the definite condemnation which was finally pronounced in January 1857, and which dispelled the hope that Kant had now found his Aquinas.

The Catholic school of Tübingen, although not entirely free from Kantian and Hegelian influences, followed another direc-

tion. Its foundations lay in the mystic idealism of Novalis, in the universalistic theories of Frederick Schlegel, and also in the Catholic theosophy of Franz Baaden. It aimed at a compromise between the old theology, with its external revelation to be learned by pedagogical method, and the new theories that the whole religion was to be found in human consciousness by reflexion. Religion cannot be learned by education alone; man must descend into his own heart to find God: but neither is religion a philosophy, "It is a positive reality, at once of psychological and historical order, which, however, must express itself in concepts and ideas. The true religious system is therefore an ideological whole which projects on thought the concrete religion in an enlarged and purified form."⁹ On these lines the theologians of Tübingen, Drey, Kuhn, and especially Möhler, reached the highest point of modern speculation nearest in spirit to the orthodox Catholic tradition.

Hermes was radically hostile to all forms of scholasticism and of mediaeval theology; Günther, in the name of his dualism, criticized sharply the theology of the fathers and of the scholastic doctors, because both, following in the footsteps of ancient philosophy, had not understood the essential difference between the Absolute and his creation, and in spite of their orthodox consciousness they were really semi-panteists. The theologians of Tübingen, on the contrary, far from condemning the fathers and the scholastics, professed to be their continuators, and to represent substantially the same theology, only in a further stage of development. The great sin of the school of Tübingen was its undisguised hostility to ultramontaniam and to the doctrines of papal autocracy, which made it an object of suspicion to Rome; it escaped an explicit condemnation, but its positions were later demolished by the sweeping formulations of the Vatican Council.

The school of Tübingen had two great merits: first, that of having emphasized the necessity in theology of historical knowledge before approaching speculative problems, thus reviving the interest in historical studies among the Catholic theologians; and secondly, that of realizing and clearly stating that a restoration of Catholic theology which would set aside

entirely the scholastic tradition would fail of its purpose. But when about the middle of the century a small group of theologians began to advocate a simple return to an integral Thomistic philosophy, the school of Tübingen energetically protested. As a reaction against the intellectualistic exaggerations of Thomistic Aristotelianism, Tübingen emphasized more than before the value of intuitive faith, and against the revived axiom "*philosophia ancilla theologiae*" it insisted on complete philosophical independence.

In Rome for practical reasons the theologians were ordinarily more engaged in the critical analysis of others' systems than in constructive speculation, but for a while Rosmini's ontologism, which had gained much ground in Italy, France, and Belgium, seemed on the path to conquer the seat of conservative theology and to provide the new ground of conciliation for the various tendencies which strove to provide a thoroughly modern philosophical basis for theology. Unfortunately Rosminianism was ferociously attacked on one hand by Gioberti, who enjoyed at that time an enormous popularity and succeeded in discrediting Rosmini's system by pointing out its philosophical weaknesses, and on the other hand by the theologians of the scholastic revival, who showed its false theological implications. Their condemnation, however, was not uttered by Rome until many years after Rosminianism had lost its importance (March 17, 1888).¹⁰

The experience of these various theological adventures confirmed the belief in the radical opposition of modern philosophy to the dogmatic tradition of the Church, and suggested to the ecclesiastical government the need of a definite step to put an end to the philosophical vagabondage of theologians. The Syllabus of Pius IX (December 1864) proscribed in a wholesale condemnation all modern philosophical and political theories, and a few years later the Vatican Council fixed still narrower limits to theological speculation and gave the last touch of ecclesiasticism to the whole theological synthesis by extending dogmatic sanction to the principle of papal infallibility. The encyclical *Aeterni Patris* of Leo XIII (1878), which urged Catholics to restore in their schools the study of scholastic

philosophy and especially of Aquinas' system, was the natural conclusion of the tendency that inspired the dogmatic work of the council.

The ground for such a restoration was already prepared. From the middle of the nineteenth century a movement, timid at first but making steady progress in the ranks of the clergy, undertook the task of reaffirming the value of scholasticism *tanquam philosophia perennis*. It became more definite when the Society of Jesus, after some hesitation, finally threw into the balance the weight of its authority.¹¹ Loyola in his Constitutions had proclaimed Aquinas the guide of the Society in theology: in philosophy he had made it the law to follow Aristotelianism, "*In logica et philosophia naturali et morali et metaphysica doctrina Aristotelis sequenda est.*" Cartesianism, however, when it became fashionable, made a number of proselytes among the Jesuits, and in 1710 the general Tamburini, while proscribing a number of Cartesian propositions involving theological doctrines, at the same time stated: "*Systema Cartesii defendi potest tanquam hypothesis.*" Nevertheless, such a permission seems to have been interpreted in a very broad sense, for a free accommodation of Cartesianism with a flavor of Platonism became the common philosophy of the Jesuit teachers in schools and colleges. In the directions issued for the Society in 1832 all mention of scholastic philosophy is omitted, save for a recommendation that students should be taught the meaning of those scholastic terms which they were likely to meet in their future theological studies: "*Quamvis eae fugiendae sint voces quibus quae res subiiciuntur facile intelligi non possint, sermonem tamen scholasticorum eis non ignorare necesse est qui theologiae deinde vacabunt.*" It took, however, but a few years for the Society to revive the scholastic tradition among its members; as a matter of fact among the neothomists of the early period the two Jesuits, Liberatore in Italy, and Kleutgen in Germany, were certainly the two most prominent personalities. It is said to have been Kleutgen who made the first draft of Leo's encyclical *Aeterni Patris*.

In advocating the exhumation of scholastic philosophy the pope warned Catholics that scholasticism ought to be accommo-

dated to modern thought, and that all parts of the system dependent upon such mediaeval scientific doctrines as had already been definitely discarded by modern science ought to be put aside. The wisdom of such a rule and its necessity were obvious, but the difficulty was to carry it into practice. To draw a line of division between what was dead in scholasticism and what was to be considered alive, was a formidable task, and the general directions given in the pontifical document were too indefinite to be of much help. Moreover the determining reason for this return to scholasticism being a theological motive, it was obvious that the revival would be directed by theological interests and subordinated to them. The choice was to be governed by the logical and practical exigencies of the dogmatic formulations of Trent and of the Vatican Council, in order to supply apologetics with new weapons of defence and offence against all modern philosophical, political, and social doctrines condemned by the Syllabus and the Council. Within these limits and on such a narrow platform was to take place the new reconstruction of scholasticism in harmony both with the dogmatic teaching of the Church and with modern science.

Great hopes of a new golden age for theology were founded on this revival of scholasticism; it seemed that, once free from fideistic and rationalistic infiltrations in philosophy, Catholic thinkers guided by Aquinas ought to find again the lost art of high metaphysical speculation so as to complete and bring up to date the great theological systematization of the mediaeval doctors. It did not take long to discover that the first necessity was to find out what was the exact teaching of Aquinas on many questions of vital importance. During the late scholastic period, when the conflicts between Thomists and Scotists, between Dominicans and Franciscans, degenerated into philosophical flow of words and cheap theological gossip, and much more in the period of the Catholic counter-reformation, interpreters and commentators of Aquinas frequently read their own thought into his books and labelled as Thomistic doctrines for which Aquinas was not responsible. But a critical revision of the Thomistic tradition could not be accomplished without a general revision and a reconstruction of the history of scho-

lasticism, and one of the most useful results of this revival thus came to be a new impulse to historical research in mediaeval learning.¹² On the other hand, the work of adapting the scholastic system to the new scientific mentality of today required a conscientious analysis and a discriminative estimate of modern scientific theories and discoveries: above all it required the adoption of modern scientific methods of work and a close familiarity with all the instruments of research that modern ingenuity has put at the disposal of our men of science. Evidently many years of hard work were necessary before new scholasticism would be ready to absorb in a new synthesis modern science within Catholic dogma.

Two tendencies appeared very early among modern scholastics: one which advocated the return to what may be called an integral Thomism, with the exception of those few doctrines, either theological, like that of the immaculate conception, about which the Church had decided against Aquinas, or merely scientific, like the Ptolemaic cosmology, which all would agree ought to be discarded. The other tendency claimed a broader basis and the right to derive its doctrines from other scholastic sources besides Aquinas, with more substantial and radical concessions to modern science. It is not possible to draw a clear line of distinction, either topographical or chronological, between the followers of those two tendencies, but in a general way the former may be said to have been predominant in Rome, in the Gregorian University controlled by the Jesuits, among the Dominicans, and in a number of seminaries and theological schools of Italy, France, and Germany. Its adherents were men whose interests centered primarily in theology rather than in mere philosophy, and to them the axiom *philosophia ancilla theologiae* was the fundamental principle of their methodology.¹³

The second tendency found favor among those whose interests were primarily philosophical or historical, and has inspired the manifold activities of the department of philosophy of the University of Louvain, since the establishment there (1882) of a chair of scholastic philosophy whose first occupant was the secular priest Mercier, now archbishop of Malines and

cardinal. Historical interests were predominant in the neo-scholastic circles of Munich, where was founded the great collection, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*; while in Italy the same scientific tendency with a special interest in sociological doctrines prevailed among a small but able group of scholars who have recently organized in Milan a Catholic University with the primary purpose of making it a stronghold of neo-scholasticism.¹⁴ This neo-scholasticism of the second tendency, which has surrounded itself with all the paraphernalia of modern historical critical method and scientific laboratories, claims, at least in words, a complete independence for philosophy, and its program is "not to repeat but to think over again the Thomistic synthesis in the light of the problems of today and of the new facts which they presuppose."¹⁵ It is not within the scope of this article to give even a general outline of the history of neo-scholasticism and its doubtful accomplishments in the field of metaphysics and psychology or of its studies, which have been more noteworthy, in the history of mediaeval thought; our interest is in the question whether the scholastic revival has exercised an influence on modern Catholic theology, and if so of what kind.

II

The bibliography of speculative theology of the last forty years does not include a very large number of works by Catholic theologians, and apart from text-books and monographs of little importance and articles of transient interest, but few volumes claim attention. As a whole they compare unfavorably with the Catholic literature of the same period dealing with the history of theology or with Church history, and even with the works on special topics such as liturgics and Christian archaeology.¹⁶ Of the text-books those of A. Tanquerey¹⁷ and of J. Pohle,¹⁸ two European theologians who taught during many years in America, the former at St. Mary's Seminary in Baltimore, the latter at the Catholic University of Washington, may be regarded as good specimens of the new type of manuals adopted in theological schools. Unlike their predecessors they

pay more attention to the historical side of the questions, to modern philosophical doctrines, and now and then even to those scientific theories and discoveries which directly affect the theological tradition.

It is interesting to notice that in many of these new manuals of Catholic theology the authors insist more than was usual with older theologians that the student is not to expect in dogmatic theology that rational certainty which is proper to physical science and even to metaphysics, theology being a science based on authority. Tanquerey is very emphatic on this point, and quotes the famous sentence of Pascal: "*Sapienter igitur Deus ita disposuit ut evidentia (i.e. in theology) sufficiens esset pro hominibus bonae voluntatis, non tamen ita cogens ut rebelles etiam compelleret voluntates.*"¹⁹

The main contribution, however, to speculative theology is represented by the treatises of the Jesuit professors of dogmatics in the Gregorian University of Rome, Dominicus Palmieri and his successors Camillus Mazzella and Louis Billot. Palmieri represents the period of transition, and his theology, and still more his philosophy, were not completely immune from the influences at work before the scholastic revival. As a matter of fact he was discharged because he was not sufficiently devoted to the Thomistic system, and was succeeded by Mazzella, a learned man but lacking originality and entirely out of touch with modern science and modern mentality. Aquinas' works he knew well, but relied too much on the interpreters who had adulterated Aquinas' teaching, and especially on the Jesuit theologians of the sixteenth century. His contempt for modern science was as absolute as his faith in scholasticism, and he did not hesitate, for instance, to state in the first edition of his *De Deo Creante* (Rome, 1820, p. 156) that fossils were not an evidence against the literal interpretation of the six days of creation of Genesis because they may have been created by God *in statu perfecto* as fossils.

Mazzella was made a cardinal, and his successor was the French Jesuit Louis Billot, now himself a cardinal and the most conspicuous theologian of the contemporary Roman Church. Cardinal Billot professes an unbounded devotion to

Aquinas, and there is no doctrine or solution of controverted problems that he does not strive to put under the protection of Aquinas' authority. It is his opinion that all theological questions find their solution either directly or indirectly by deduction in Aquinas' teaching. The exhumation of all sorts of Thomistic theories either discarded or misrepresented by the interpreters is the special accomplishment of Billot's theological labors. The impression one receives from his books ²⁰ is that the theologians of the last six centuries have misunderstood Aquinas in many more points than is commonly thought, and that to him was reserved the credit of rediscovering the genuine St. Thomas. But other theologians, and especially some prominent members of the Dominican order, which always remained faithful to the Thomistic system even when the Jesuits themselves had discarded it in favor of Descartes, subjected the works of Billot to a searching analysis and finally accused the eminent Thomist of having himself adulterated many a doctrine of Aquinas and of falsely attributing to the Angelic Doctor theories of his own on gratuitous predestination to glory, the causality and character of sacramental grace, and certain minor points.²¹

The common characteristic of this theological school is its systematic determination to ignore the objections against the traditional theories made in consequence of modern biblical and historical criticism. And yet the most formidable attacks against scholastic theology at the beginning of the twentieth century came not so much from philosophical schools as from other sources. The conclusions of biblical criticism destroyed the historical basis of the Tridentine doctrine of inspiration; while the new studies of positive theology demolished that large part of the scholastic structure which was based on a fragmentary or adulterated patristic historical tradition, on a defective knowledge of the historical environment by which the acts of the councils must be interpreted, and on a wrong estimation of the value of the pontifical legislation, so grossly disfigured by forgeries and interpolations of which the mediaeval theologians who made the scholastic synthesis were not aware. The attack was the more serious the more it became clear that

it was not suggested by sectarian hatred, but on the one hand grew out of purely scientific convictions based on facts and proceeding from men who in many cases had no personal religious interests to defend, and on the other hand came from the young generation of Catholic scholars who were eager to put modern science at the service of Christian apologetics.²² The history of Modernism is well known in its general lines, and it is not necessary to recall how it was crushed by severe disciplinary repression rather than by free discussion. But for the history of modern Catholic theology one circumstance is interesting to note. At the beginning of the twentieth century such representative works of scholastic theology as those which up to that time Cardinal Billot had published, concentrated their effort on the integral restoration of Aquinas' teaching, and polemized against the Protestant doctrines of the sixteenth century, against the rationalistic premises of the theologians of the early nineteenth century, and even against liberalism as defined by the Syllabus of Pius IX and the canons of the Vatican Council; but in these books almost nothing betrays an interest in the real problems of contemporary Catholic theology, which, since they concerned the essential points of the whole system, could not safely be overlooked by those theologians who in the Gregorian University spoke as "*magistri in Ecclesia Dei*." ²³

The reason for this attitude of the Thomist theologians of the Gregorian University in that period is to be found not only in their deep distrust of so-called scientific conclusions, but also, and primarily, in the assumption that all objections against traditional theology raised in the name of biblical and historical criticism were in the last analysis based on and a direct product of the philosophical and theological errors of rationalism and fideism, both leading by different paths to agnosticism, — all errors which had been already condemned by the Church and were considered as buried and left behind by the neo-thomistic restoration.

As a matter of fact, when Pius X in his encyclical *Pascendi* (the first draft of which is said to have been the work of Billot) outlined for purposes of condemnation a systematic ex-

position of Modernism, he accomplished his task by a simple reduction of Modernism to philosophical agnosticism as its ultimate source: as such the pope had only to renew the old anathemas against the new disguise of old errors. That at the bottom of the modernist question there was, and could be found, a philosophical problem was true, and this lay in the nature of the case: but the Modernists were not entirely wrong in accusing the encyclical of having misrepresented their position by assuming a specific philosophy as the source and the starting point of their movement. They contended that Modernism was really due only to the practical problem created by the radical opposition of the results of biblical and historical criticism to the Tridentine conception of inspiration and to the dogmatic interpretation of scholastic theology. In regard to philosophy Modernism as such had taken position only in so far as it denied the validity of scholastic criteriology and, as a consequence, of scholastic apologetics, and affirmed the necessity of severing the cause of scholasticism, old and new as well, from the cause of Christian dogmatics and apologetics.²⁴

It must be said, however, that the contention of the encyclical had at least an apparent justification in the existence of a Catholic neo-kantism, represented by the French group of the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, and of an anti-scholastic theology represented by Hermann Schell and the school of Würzburg. Although the former appeared to be essentially a philosophical movement, and the latter a theological adventure very similar in character to those of the German theologians before the scholastic restoration, yet they had in common not only their radical opposition to scholasticism, but also their apologetic motive. Laberthonnière and Blondel,²⁵ the best representatives of the French group, presented their immanentism rather as a method than as a doctrine, and justified it by practical necessity. They sought to expound a Christian philosophy which would compel the attention of modern thinkers who have come to consider it an axiomatic principle "*que rien ne peut entrer en l'homme qui ne sorte de lui et ne corresponde en quelque façon à un besoin d'expansion, et que ni comme fait historique, ni comme enseignement traditionnel, ni*

comme obligation surajoutée du dehors, il n'y a pour lui vérité qui compte et précepte admissible sans être, de quelque manière, autonome et autochtone."²⁶

Starting from the fact that in our knowledge and in our activity as well, there is a constant lack of proportion between the object itself and the mind, between the action and the will — *ni ma pensée ne peut égaler mon action, ni mon action ne peut égaler ma pensée*²⁷ — Blondel concludes that the only way of explaining the existence in man of both the efficient cause and the final cause, whose coincident presence produces the lack of proportion between thought and practice, is to admit the permanent mediation of a perfect mind and a perfect activity: "*Tout ce qu'il y a de beauté et de vie dans les choses, tout ce qu'il y a de lumière et de puissance en l'homme, enveloppe, dans son imperfection et son infirmité même, une perfection souveraine.*" This perfection is God, and it is towards Him that we must turn our life, as towards the inevitable complement of our activity, in so far as this activity has for its necessary goal to define and to realize in itself such a perfection: "*Ce que nous connaissons de Dieu est ce surcroît de vie intérieure qui réclame son emploi; nous ne pouvons donc connaître Dieu sans vouloir le devenir en quelque façon.*" Blondel, however, did not deny the existence, nor the necessity, of an external historical revelation, but only restricted its value to the strictly dogmatic life of the Church.²⁸

Immanentism was accused of Baianism in so far as it implies a logical denial of the supernatural character of grace and, as a consequence, of the whole supernatural order. Moreover, by denying the rational validity of the historical argument for revelation it upset *de facto* the very foundations of the Catholic system.²⁹ In September 1899 Pope Leo XIII found it necessary to publish an encyclical condemning Kantism and warning Catholic priests and laymen of the dangers of drawing their inspiration from Kant in the fallacious hope of building up a new philosophy that may serve as a human basis for revealed faith. But no explicit condemnation was decreed until Pius X.

A more specific apologetic motive lay behind the new theological method inaugurated by Hermann Schell of the theo-

logical faculty of Würzburg. The systematic attacks against Catholic theology on the part of German philosophers, and especially of Eduard von Hartmann, who since the publication of his *Philosophie des Unbewussten* had acquired an enormous popularity, centered especially on two points, the complete and helpless slavery of Catholic thought and the absurdity and immorality of Catholic eschatology.³⁰ The eternity of hell with its disproportion between the guilt and the penalty is not only an atrocious insult to justice, but puts the Catholic God on the level of a savage deity. Still more violent was the indictment of Catholic theology in a book which made a great impression, *Der Kampf zweier Weltanschauungen; eine Kritik der alten und neuesten Philosophie mit Einschluss der christlichen Offenbarung* (Stuttgart, 1898), by Spicker, who pointed out very strikingly the illogical character of this dualistic eschatology, which by sanctioning the eternity of evil implicitly destroys the very conception of God.

Against these attacks Schell undertook to vindicate the freedom of Catholic theology and to explain the dogma of the eternity of hell. His work³¹ came to be itself a severe indictment of scholastic theology, accused by him of having misinterpreted the true Catholic doctrine. On the question of Christian eschatology Schell tried to find an escape from the pressure of Hartmann's argument in a complete separation between the metaphysical conception of God and the eschatological teaching of the Church. The former is a strictly philosophical deduction which does not imply as a logical corollary the dogma of the eternity of hell, just as the metaphysical conception of God does not imply the dogma of redemption. These dogmas belong exclusively to revelation, and the arguments from reason do not apply to them. But Schell went a step further and attempted a new interpretation of the dogma itself. By assuming that the sinners in hell retain their free will, Schell explained the eternity of the punishment as the result not of a divine decree but of the human will itself, which by clinging to its sin in the moment of death has rendered sterile that power of wishing good that still remains. The implications of such a theory were far-reaching, for they affected

the traditional conception of sin and in the last analysis the essence of other doctrines.

At this point Rome thought it time to strike, and a decree of February 23, 1899, put on the Index Schell's books on dogmatics and apologetics.³² *La Philosophie de l'Action* of Blondel and the new apologetics of Schell came to be more or less directly connected with the Modernist movement, and seemed to justify the assumptions of the encyclical of Pius X. At the same time the Church recognized that something needed to be done in positive and historical studies also.

Catholic scholars in the various fields of biblical studies, apologetics, positive theology, and ecclesiastical history had been busily at work to show that the results of critical and historical studies were either groundless, or, where they had to be accepted, could be so interpreted as not to affect in any way the Church and dogma. But these scholars, especially in matters of the Scriptures were still far from demonstrating scientifically the falsity of the conclusions of biblical and historical criticism, and even far from accord with one another as to the value of the critical method itself. Just as, when the decay of scholasticism deprived theology of its logical support, and so plunged it into that state of confusion and uncertainty from which it was rescued by the scholastic restoration, so likewise criticism, in demolishing the traditional ground on which Catholic exegesis and positive theology stood firm, created a panic among the theologians and gave rise to conflicts among Catholic scholars which required an immediate new methodical work of reconstruction. Therefore Leo XIII established a Biblical Commission to sit as judge of the conflicts, and clothed its *responsa* with normative power, although they did not possess, and are not supposed to do so, either scientific or dogmatic infallibility. Pius X added the Biblical Institute, which is intended to carry on the necessary work of readjustment in biblical theology under the vigilant eye of the supreme authority of the Church.

While the neo-thomistic school was thus busy in the integral restoration of Aquinas' teaching, and was engaged against Modernism in the theological field, the neo-scholastic school of

Louvain had taken another direction. Let us say at once that the hope that by clothing the essentials of scholasticism in modern robes the school of Louvain would become also a centre of fresh theological speculation has not as yet been realized, and it is doubtful whether it ever will be. Probably the peculiar circumstances in which the school found itself in the very beginning in part account for this. The new resurrection of scholasticism was greeted with much skepticism by the philosophical circles of Europe; they refused to take it seriously because, according to the sarcastic remark which became popular, it was a philosophy "by decree," a philosophy "made to order," and as such lacked the freedom and independence from external authority which is the first requisite of serious scientific work. This reproach was a thorn in the flesh of the Louvain school, which missed no opportunity to proclaim its philosophical autonomy and accepted the challenge to persuade the world that in Louvain philosophy was not *ancilla theologiae*.

Si nous songeons à asservir notre pensée en philosophie à celle d'un maître celui-ci s'appelait-il Saint Thomas, c'est Saint Thomas lui-même qui nous condamnerait. Locus ab auctoritate quae fundatur super ratione humana est infirmissimus.

Such was the statement made in the program (by Cardinal Mercier) of the *Revue Néo-scholastique*, the official organ of the school (vol. I, 1894, p. 14). And still more strikingly Professor De Wulf, in a pamphlet incorporated later in an enlarged form in his book, *Introduction à la philosophie scholastique* (1899), proclaimed:

Above all, scholastic philosophy is autonomous: it has a value of its own, a value that is absolute and independent. The independence of modern scholasticism in relation to all theology, as in relation to all other sciences whatever, is simply an interpretation of that unquestionable principle of scientific progress, as applicable in the twentieth century as it was in the thirteenth, that a properly constituted science derives its formal object, its principles, and its constructive method exclusively from its own domain, and that in these things any borrowing from another science would compromise its very right to a separate existence.³³

No wonder that the philosophical school of Louvain has carefully avoided trespassing on theological ground, and has

pushed its scruples in this matter to the point of uttering frequent warning to its members not to yield to the temptation of intermingling apologetic purposes with their scientific work.

There are times [said Cardinal Mercier in an address to the students], namely those of scientific research, in which neutrality is a duty with us. We must not handle the problems of physics, of chemistry, of biology, those of history or of social economy, with the preconceived purpose of finding in them a confirmation of our religious beliefs. . . . To consider a science from a different angle than that which is presented by its formal object, to carry in the study of this latter an attention divided between this object and another problem pertaining to another science, between this object and an apologetic task, is to misunderstand the very essence of scientific speculation and to reverse the process that the investigator is in duty bound to follow (*Revue Néo-scholastique*, vol. V, 1908, pp. 5-6).

No less definite on this point is the attitude of the Italian neo-scholastic group, which, commenting on the utterance of Cardinal Mercier, states in the first issue of its organ *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scholastica*:

Philosophy must be neutral. In so far as it concerns the philosopher himself, he has always the same right to be neutral; sometimes he has even the duty to be so; in most cases to be neutral is better (January, 1909, p. 48).

With this *fin de non-recevoir* Louvainian neo-scholasticism dismissed theology.

It is interesting to notice how this need of emphasizing to the utmost the autonomy of modern scholasticism has affected even the historical reconstruction of mediaeval scholasticism attempted by De Wulf. The term scholasticism, first used by the humanists as a disparaging word to characterize the whole mediaeval philosophy, has now acquired an historical value, and hence a concrete definition of its content is needed by the historians. Some of them found the essence of scholasticism in its Aristotelian connections, others in its syllogistic method, others, and the greater number, considered its specific character to reside in its subordination, both pedagogical and material, to theology. De Wulf effectively criticized all those definitions, and proposed to give the name scholasticism only to a definite mediaeval philosophical system, which is more or less easily isolated from the chaos of mediaeval philosophy so as to be

considered as a consistent and independent whole. In the main such a system is best represented by Aquinas; but it is not represented by him alone nor by him entirely (if it were, scholasticism would be identical with Thomism), but was the doctrine of a large group of philosophers who shared in common the fundamental and essential principles of the system, disagreeing on other points. Under this definition not only Aquinas and Albert of Cologne, but Bonaventura and Duns Scotus and Occam himself would all belong to the same class, while all the mediaeval philosophers who did not hold to those fundamental points would have to be grouped in another class, the anti-scholastics.³⁴

It has been pointed out that this classification of De Wulf is entirely arbitrary and unhistorical. It does not correspond to historical reality, but is an artificial construction like the hippogryph, made by gathering diverse historical elements into a factitious whole; and in many cases the divergencies which separate these ill-mated companions are more fundamental than the points on which they agree. But the essential motive of De Wulf's definition is the need of finding in mediaeval scholasticism at least a virtual autonomy for philosophy in independence of theology in order to justify modern scholasticism in adopting the same attitude. The difficulty, however, lies in the positive fact that the existence in the middle ages of a consistent and independent philosophical system which explained the universe by the light of reason with no reference whatever to revealed truth, is a strictly modern invention, for such a system was not considered autonomous by the mediaeval philosophers themselves. Not only were external causes active, as De Wulf would like us to believe, such as the pedagogy of the mediaeval curriculum or the sociological character of the essentially religious civilization of that period, but still more the final *reductio ad unitatem* of all mediaeval speculation was founded on theological premises and worked on theological grounds.

The whole *cours de philosophie* of Louvain is affected by this conception, which before it was stated historically already underlay Cardinal Mercier's use of the materials of mediaeval

scholasticism in those neo-scholastic treatises, which stand as the eminent cardinal's title to scientific glory. His synthesis, as is obvious from the program of the school, is not confined to the mediaeval material, but has derived from various and more modern sources a large amount of other material which he has forced into the Thomistic frame. Whether he has succeeded in making a homogeneous whole of these heterogeneous materials is open to doubt. It has been declared inconsistent not only by the non-scholastic philosophers and, as well, by the scholastics who advocate a Thomistic integralism, but also by the younger generation of the neo-scholastics themselves, who have made plain their intention to throw overboard the whole Louvainian synthesis. Their indictment of Mercier's criteriology leaves no doubt on this point. According to Olgiati, one of the most distinguished members of the Italian neo-scholastic group:

The position of Mercier is contradictory in so far as it claims to refute absolute dogmatism and at the same time does not itself reach objective conclusions otherwise than by presupposing always the legitimacy of the very process which is peculiar to absolute dogmatism (*Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scholastica*, vol. VI, p. 337).

As a consequence the Italian group has declared its independence of Louvain on this capital point, which involves the rejection of the whole synthesis:

Mature reflexion and above all the coming among us of young men who are well trained in modern philosophy have produced the doubt whether the criteriology of Louvain is satisfactory, and we have more and more detached ourselves from our friends of Louvain in the solution of many problems, but especially of this one. In this criticism of Louvain we have found ourselves to be all in accord, those who defend the pure and integral Thomistic tradition as well as those who, being more accessible to the influence of modern thought, aim to think over again their scholasticism in the light of modern knowledge. This accord is purely negative, but it has a high value in so far as it shows that, starting from different points of view, we agree in affirming that it is useless to attempt the reconstruction of the theory of knowledge by starting from the critique of knowledge. . . . We recognize willingly that the school of Louvain has the merit of having called the attention of scholasticism to the problem of criteriology, and that Cardinal Mercier has fully demonstrated that this is the central problem of a philosophical system; but his solution no longer satisfies us. Therefore the first thing we must now do is to show the insufficiencies of the Louvainian construction (*ib. pp. 450 f.*).

But those who felt more disappointed in the tendencies of Louvain were the Thomistic theologians who could not agree with Mercier and De Wulf in their two fundamental points: their refusal to adhere to an integral Thomistic philosophy and their claim of philosophical independence. Such a claim was labelled as philosophical "liberalism." Jesuits and Dominicans warned Louvain that the path of its philosophy was leading to Kantianism, and that they were going astray from the pontifical directions of the encyclical *Aeterni Patris*. Such was the opinion of Janvier, the celebrated Dominican, successor of Lacordaire, Monsabre, and D'Hulst in the pulpit of Notre Dame at Paris, who had no doubt that "the most enlightened and right-minded scholastics took the encyclical of Leo literally and proceeded to expound the whole teaching of Saint Thomas, following both the method and the style of the Angelic Doctor himself." ³⁵

It was fortunate for Louvain that the pontificate of Leo XIII, who considered that school as his own creation, was long enough to permit its philosophy to gain a foothold among the younger clergy and to resist the attacks from various sides; it was still more fortunate that at the time of the suppression of Modernism the responsibility for the orthodoxy of Louvain rested on the shoulders of a Roman cardinal like Mercier, of distinguished authority and personally above suspicion. But there was a moment when Pius X himself was not far from thinking that Louvain was in part responsible for encouraging among the younger clergy the respect for and confidence in modern science which was one of the evil sources of Modernism. When Janvier uttered the words quoted above, Professor De Wulf remarked that Janvier's "expression of opinion called forth numerous protests, even unexpected protests; and we have every reason to be glad that it did so." ³⁶ We wonder whether he was equally glad when a few years later in a letter of praise and encouragement to the new editor of the *Revue Thomiste*, a periodical of integralist Thomistic philosophy and theology to which Janvier was a frequent contributor, Pius X stated clearly that he fully agreed with Janvier's view:

*Sed tamen confidamus . . . doctrinam Aquinatis incorruptam atque integram propagando, ipsos qui a christiana philosophia alieni sunt, paullatim adducatis ut hunc adeant sapientiae fontem in omni disciplinae genere uberrium.*³⁷

No less objectionable in the eyes of the theologians was the emphasis put by Louvain upon the independence and neutrality of their philosophy. It was explicitly in the name of this theory that the French group of Catholic neo-kantians, the Catholic pragmatists and immanentists, asserted the right to philosophize outside the ranks of scholasticism, and it was on the same principle that modernist historians claimed the right to pursue neutral historical criticism. If a neutral philosophy was legitimate, why not a neutral history? To clear himself from the slightest complicity with Modernism Cardinal Mercier found it necessary to break his silence and to throw a stone at the new heretics in his Lenten Pastoral of 1908.

In the form of an attack upon Modernism the pastoral was primarily a defence of himself and of his school:

Modernism is not the modern form of science, and therefore the condemnation of Modernism is neither the condemnation of that science, of which we are justly proud, nor the repudiation of its methods, which Catholic scientists rightly regard it an honor to put in practice and to teach.

Modernism, according to the Cardinal, consists essentially in the rejection of revelation and of the authority of the hierarchy, and its origin is due in the main to Protestant influences, but Belgium has escaped its pernicious tendency:

Thank God Belgian Catholics have escaped the heresies of Modernism. The representatives of philosophy and theology in our universities and free faculties and those of the seminaries and religious congregations have unanimously and spontaneously declared and proved in a document signed by each of them that the Pope by his courageous encyclical has saved the faith and protected science.

It was this pastoral that provoked the famous letter of George Tyrrell: *Mediaevalism: A Reply to Cardinal Mercier*.

Nevertheless the struggle against Louvain continued up to the death of Pius X, and when the more liberal policy inaugurated by Benedict XV brought relief to the tense situation,

Cardinal Mercier expressed his satisfaction in outspoken words:

It was not enough, for the self-appointed knights of orthodoxy, to profess oneself a faithful Catholic; in order more religiously to obey the Pope they pretended it to be necessary to challenge the authority of the bishops. Journalists without commission dared to excommunicate those who refused to pass under the Caudine Forks of their Integralism. Fear had invaded every religious soul, and honest consciences were suffering, but they could not speak.

The integralism to which Cardinal Mercier referred was that doctrine which taught that the authority of the pope over the Catholic people is not confined to the religious life alone, but is supreme in political and social matters as well; but it will not be a misrepresentation of the Cardinal's mind to suppose that Thomistic integralism was included in his energetic denunciation.³⁸

The war and the wanton destruction of Louvain and of its libraries and laboratories, the dispersal of its professors and students, stopped all the activities of the school until 1919, when the work of reconstruction was immediately started and the *Revue Néo-scholastique* resumed its publication. In so far as concerns Cardinal Mercier and his school, the dangerous times of Pius X belong to the remote past. It cannot be said, however, that the neo-scholastic sky is entirely clear of clouds. This appears from the circular letter of the general Ledochowski to all the members of the Society of Jesus (1917), in which the few cases where they are permitted to discard Aquinas' teaching in philosophy are carefully described and limited to questions of secondary importance. This letter was warmly approved and recommended by Pope Benedict XV and thereby acquired a normative value outside Jesuit circles.³⁹

While Louvain has little to be satisfied with from this side, it has still less to be pleased with in the attitude taken by the neo-scholastics outside its school. Its influence on them is rapidly declining: both the doctrinal synthesis of Cardinal Mercier and the historical synthesis of De Wulf are in process of disintegration in the hands of their former disciples. What will take the place in the near future of the Louvainian synthe-

sis among the younger generation of scholastics it is too early to foresee.⁴⁰ But certainly it will not be the philosophy of Thomistic integralism. The school of Louvain has helped to make impossible such unconditional surrender, and this is at present its greatest accomplishment. Theology, as we have remarked already, has received no direct contribution from Louvain,⁴¹ but indirectly, by keeping alive the scientific spirit and the historical interest in scholastic circles, and by remaining in touch with modern forms of thought, the school of Louvain has done a great service to theology and has coöperated with Modernism in preventing the theologians from slumbering quietly under the laurels gathered by scholasticism in the thirteenth century.

III

In the last years of the nineteenth century, the president of St. John's Catholic Seminary of Boston, Père Hogan, a French Lazarist of Irish birth, and a theologian imbued with the doctrines and the spirit of Newman, outlined the principles by which Catholic theology ought to be renovated.⁴² This was first of all to be by discarding in most cases the literal interpretation of the Bible: for instance, the prophetic description of the resurrection and the last judgment must be regarded as presenting only a poetic picture (p. 175). In the second place a discrimination must be made among the teachings of the fathers according to the results of modern historical criticism. Many opinions, for instance those of St. Augustine, were only inferences from his own personal thinking or his own personal experience, and were set forth by him in a tentative way. Soon, however, his hesitations were forgotten and those opinions were repeated and transmitted as a sort of tradition from which theology was not free to depart (p. 177). And finally the *a priori* deductive method of mediaeval theology must be used as little as possible and only when its results are susceptible of verification by direct observation.

For deductive method was to the scholastics not only a method of demonstration but the principal means of discovery in every sphere of knowledge. It was so that they came to know everything about the angelic world; that

they told the story of the creation with details such as no one would venture upon nowadays; that they described the state of innocence as if they themselves had lived through it, and were led to attack with touching candor the most arduous problems and boldly to rush in where angels fear to tread.

The hopes of Père Hogan have not as yet been realized, and Catholic theology has made little progress in that direction in these last twenty-five years: in most of these matters it has remained at a stand-still, in some it has even had a set-back. For instance, far from considering the prophetic description of the last judgment as "only a poetic picture from which no solid facts can be extracted with certainty beyond the reality of these great events" (Hogan, p. 176), the great spokesman of modern Catholic theology, Cardinal Billot, in a recent book (*La Parousie*, 1920) takes it literally, and even appeals to the theories of modern astronomy regarding the ways in which the world may meet a catastrophic end in order to prove that these scientific theories agree with the prophecies of the eschatological passages of the Synoptics and with the Book of Revelation. Cardinal Billot ends his book with a gloomy picture of the present period, in which he finds already some of the precursory signs of the approaching end and especially one which is very significant. According to the teaching of Paul (Rom. 11, 25-32) and to the prophecy of Hosea (3, 4-5) the whole Jewish people shall be converted to Christianity before the end comes: "and they shall fear the Lord and his goodness in the last days." But such a wholesale conversion of the Jewish people cannot take place unless their dispersion also comes to an end, according to the same prophecy of Hosea: the fact therefore of the reorganization of a free state in Palestine, which is the *prélude obligé* of the Jewish conversion, is a clear sign of the approach of the great catastrophe (pp. 344 f.).

La Parousie claims to be a refutation of the Modernist contention that Jesus was mistaken in teaching that the end of the world was near at hand, "This generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled." Cardinal Billot's exegesis of the eschatological passages of Mark 13, Matthew 24, and Luke 21 is not new, but certainly it had never been put forth so forcibly as in his book. The words of Jesus contain a

double prophecy, that of the fall of Jerusalem and that of the catastrophic end of the world. Of both it was prophesied that they would take place within the generation of Jesus, and as a matter of fact both of them were fulfilled: the first, that concerning the fall of Jerusalem, in reality, the second, that concerning the final catastrophe, in figure: that is to say, the fall of Jerusalem, being a figure of the catastrophic end of the world, fulfilled both prophecies:

Dans la prophétie qui nous occupe, tout ce qui se rapporte au dernier jour du monde a eu sans difficulté en la ruine de Jérusalem, et par conséquent avant que fût passée la génération contemporaine de Jésus, un premier accomplissement . . . en figure sans doute, ou si l'on veut en effigie seulement, mais suffisant déjà selon l'usage de l'Écriture pour autoriser la locution "donec omnia fiant" (p. 65).

If the Christians of the first generations misunderstood Jesus and believed that the end was really imminent, that was due to their geographical ignorance, by which they thought that the Gospel had been already preached in the whole world. The exact meaning of the words of Jesus was reserved to be known only by us moderns; as for the Christians who lived before us, Jesus purposely left them in darkness in order that in fear of the near end they might turn their hearts to God.

To an interest in geography again⁴³ Cardinal Billot attributes the prominence in modern theology of the old question of the eternal destiny of men who live and die outside the Church. He has discussed this in seven long articles in *Les Études* under the title, 'La Providence de Dieu et le nombre infini d'hommes en dehors de la vie normale du salut.' This infinite multitude of men he divides into four large groups: (a) unbaptized children who die before the age of discretion; (b) men who although physically adults have lived in a state of perpetual spiritual infancy without ever reaching the consciousness of moral and religious life; (c) men who being adult both physically and spiritually do not come into contact with Christianity; (d) heretics and schismatics, and all members of the innumerable sects cut off from the Roman Catholic Church.

The author has so far dealt only with the first two classes. The historical side of this presentation is fragmentary and somewhat one-sided, and gave the *Revue d'Histoire et de Lit-*

térature Religieuses, edited by A. Loisy, the opportunity to state again the problem in its complete historical development and under a different light (Edmond Perrin, 'Le Cardinal Billot et le sort des infidèles défunts,' 1921, pp. 349-417).⁴⁴

The doctrine regarding unbaptized children makes a long chapter in the history of theology: from Augustine, who condemned them to the fire of hell together with all other sinners, and Abelard, who rescued them from the fire but made them suffer privation of the vision of God (thus giving origin to limbo), to Aquinas,⁴⁵ who denied their suffering altogether and granted them the joy that comes from the fruition of natural happiness; — and then again from Bellarmin, who with a reversion to the Abelardian view stamped the more lenient doctrine as Pelagianism, to Pope Pius VI,⁴⁶ who condemned as heretics those who rejected limbo and the *poena damni* to which the children were submitted, and finally to the complete revival of Aquinas' teaching by modern theologians, we assist at one of the most instructive of theological struggles. The importance of the question lies mainly in the fact that its solution depends upon the theological conception of the nature of original sin, that dogma on which the whole Christian theology stands. Any attempt at a new interpretation of this dogma cannot fail to affect the whole system.

Cardinal Billot rejects with horror the opinion, which he attributes in a special way to the theologians of the eighteenth century,⁴⁷ that original sin is a kind of personal sin for which each individual is responsible as if he had committed it of his own free will, further, that Adam was constituted by divine decree moral and juridical head of all mankind, and that all human wills were included in his will so that his descendants participated in his transgression and are all of them equally responsible for it. "No," says Cardinal Billot, "this is not the dogma of original sin; those theories are groundless, they have no basis either in the Scripture or in the Tradition and are condemned by reason" (p. 134). The true doctrine is that taught implicitly by Aquinas which Billot now states in explicit and clear form.

First of all, in the interpretation of the famous text of Paul

the Latin version of which misled St. Augustine and still misleads modern theologians, "*in quo omnes peccaverunt*," a distinction is to be made. The verb *peccare* implies a double idea, that of committing the sinful act and that of contracting a stain as a consequence of the act. In the Pauline passage it is to be taken in this second sense alone. But how was the stain contracted by the descendants of Adam? The answer is simple, God created man perfect *in statu naturae*. But besides granting to man this natural perfection, which made him capable of only a natural happiness, God in his infinite goodness lifted man to a state above nature by conferring upon him the free gift of *original justice*. This consisted primarily in the sanctifying grace which made man capable of attaining a supernatural happiness, that is, the vision of God from which by nature all created beings are excluded. To this gift was also added another gift, that of *integrity*, the effect of which is to maintain due harmony and subordination among the faculties of the human soul and between body and soul.

Now (and this is the kernel of the whole doctrine) these free gifts of original justice and integrity were not an organic part of human nature as such, neither were they a personal gift to Adam alone; but they constituted a kind of "quality affecting the species," and therefore were to be shared by all mankind. When therefore Adam by his sin lost the original justice and the gift of integrity, he lost them as he had received them, that is to say, as gifts which were to be transmitted to the whole species, "*et voilà tout le mystère du malheur de notre naissance, voilà toute l'explication du dogme qui le concerne*" (Études, vol. 162, p. 147).

As a matter of fact, continues Billot, the loss of the original justice was for man a degradation which carried with it the destruction of all the relations that were to subsist between man and God as son and father, and, moreover, it implied "an essential relation to the transgression which alone was its cause." It had therefore all the characters of a real stain coming from sin, which we contract by birth in so far as we receive the nature of Adam "*corrompue en Adam comme en sa source*" (ib. p. 148).

Such being the nature of original sin, it follows that unbaptized children cannot be condemned to the fire of hell, which is the penalty of personal sin, but neither can they be admitted to the vision of God, which is reserved for those who are exalted by sanctifying grace to the supernatural order. This is the penalty imposed upon them because they share in the corrupted nature of Adam. The privation, however, is in the domain of the unconscious, so that they do not suffer; without pain they will possess all the goods imparted to them by nature (*Études*, vol. 163, pp. 30, 31).

Billot confesses that his explanation of the nature of original sin does not rest on any express Scriptural text, and that it is founded on deductions (*Études*, vol. 169, p. 389); he recognizes that the doctrine rejected by him is the teaching of Augustine and of the majority of Catholic theologians down to modern times, but he denies that it is the doctrine of Aquinas or the real doctrine of the Church as formulated by popes and councils, especially that of Trent. E. Perrin in the article quoted above shows at a great length that Billot is mistaken in both these denials. He proves that the dogma of original sin as taught by the Church necessarily implies participation in the act of Adam, and that such has been the doctrine of popes and councils since Augustine, who based it on his traducianist theories. To the objection that free will is essentially incommunicable, they have replied without flinching: "Physically, yes; morally, no; the will of the father being considered as that of his children." And what is still more serious, this seems to be also the teaching of Aquinas, whom Billot has not fully quoted. As a matter of fact, Aquinas states clearly the voluntary character of original sin, in that the will of all his descendants is in some way included in the will of Adam: "*inordinatio quae est in isto homine ex Adam generato non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius sed voluntate primi parentis . . . sicut voluntas animae movet omnia membra ad actum*" (*Summa Theol.* 1a 2ae, quaest. LXXXI-a. 1). And still more explicitly in 'De Malo,' where he says: "An individual can be considered either as an individual or as part of a whole. . . . Considered in the second way, *an act can be his* although he has not done

it himself, not has it been done by his free will, but by the rest of the society or by its head" (IV-1). In this passage Aquinas repeats almost verbally Augustine (Op. imperf. i, 148, and Retract. i, 131), and he gives no hint that he intends his words to bear a meaning totally different from that of Augustine. There can be no doubt that the whole Catholic tradition is against Cardinal Billot. Is then Cardinal Billot a heretic? M. Perrin thinks that he is. That would be an embarrassing situation for a judge of the supreme tribunal of the Holy Roman Inquisition.

Still more radical is the teaching of Billot concerning the eternal salvation of adults in age but not in reason and conscience. By that are meant not the feeble-minded but men who remain always in complete ignorance of the laws of moral and religious life. Billot warns his readers that on this point he is breaking new ground⁴⁸ because this question has never been examined directly by the great theologians. His starting point is from the teaching of Aquinas that "no man may be considered as spiritually adult, that is to say, that no man acquires the true notion of good and evil, the consciousness of obligation and of moral responsibility, as long as his reason has not reached the knowledge of God as our creator and master, first author of our being and final end of all human life. It is on such a knowledge that "the law of conscience" is based. Now invincible ignorance excuses from sin; therefore those men who belong to this class, no matter how they live, do not commit sin, and as a consequence cannot be punished with eternal damnation: their lot is the same as that of the unbaptized children.

This argument involves two questions, one a question of fact, whether such an invincible ignorance of God is possible, and the other, granted that that is possible, whether it excuses from moral responsibility. Billot replies to both in the affirmative, and contends that the proposition holds of the great mass of heathen populations before and after Christ. Undoubtedly the whole theological tradition is against Cardinal Billot. Invincible ignorance as to God is not possible according to Paul (Rom. 1, 19-20); it is flatly denied by Augustine, "*Deum . . . quem nemo permittitur ignorare*" (in Ps. 74, 9);

it is denied by Aquinas, "*Per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse;*"⁴⁹ and even in the opinion of heathen philosophers like Cicero, "*Intelligi necesse est deos quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus.*"⁵⁰ Such a possibility, and that only in the case of men at a very low stage of savage life, seems first to have been admitted by Molina,⁵¹ as it was later by the Jesuits of Würzburg, with the restriction that such an ignorance could not last long. As for the second question, the common teaching of early Christian theology is that the great mass of heathen people were condemned to eternal damnation; and by this idea the missionary spirit of the early Church was fostered. Augustine and the whole Augustinian school deny that such ignorance excuses from sin, on the ground that it is never invincible. Aquinas and the Thomists after him teach that there are principles of natural law which produce responsibility, and that they are engraved in the hearts of all men.⁵² About the middle of the seventeenth century the Jesuits formulated the doctrine that a man does not commit sin unless he positively knows that his action is an offence against God; whence it follows that a man who acts against reason and morals without knowing God or without thinking of God is not guilty of theological sin, but only of a kind of *philosophical sin*, which, however, is not an offence against God. After the vigorous denunciation of this doctrine by Pascal and Arnaud⁵³ the plea of a philosophical sin was condemned by Rome (August 1690), because, as Bossuet contended: "*il n'y a pas de péché philosophique en ce sens que tout péché philosophique est par voie de conséquence théologique.*" It seems that Cardinal Billot's theory implies the same assumption, namely that the violations of the natural law committed by those who are in state of invincible ignorance cannot be called sins, or at least not in a theological sense.

Such is the formidable array of objections and difficulties that Billot finds in his way, and which he tries to overcome with a courage that deserves admiration. His main argument may be stated as follows: The natural knowledge of God, this quasi-innate idea of God of which Paul and Augustine and Aquinas speak in the passages quoted above, is nothing but a

vague and very indefinite idea of a superior cause on which the order of the world depends; as a matter of fact a superficial glance at the history of the heathen popular religions shows what absurd and hideous aspects it took when translated into concrete forms. It was more in the nature of a prenotion than of a real notion. If it be objected that nature gives the prenotion and must therefore possess and provide the means to reach the notion, since the *intentiones naturae* are founded on the extension of its resources, the reply is that nature does make this provision, but that not all individuals are in a condition to use it. According to Aquinas there are two ways of acquiring knowledge, the first when one finds the truth by himself, "*et hic modus dicitur inventio*," the second when one learns the truth by another, "*et hic modus dicitur secundum disciplinam*" (De Ver. q. 11, a. 1). The means of reaching a formal notion of God are provided by nature in the knowledge *secundum modum disciplinae*, that is to say, in the social life. In other words those heathen who live in an environment of culture, such as learned men, philosophers, and jurists, and in general the men of superior education, certainly attain to formal knowledge of God, and it is of them that Paul speaks when he says: "for the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against . . . men who hold the truth in unrighteousness" (Rom. 1, 18). But the great mass of ignorant people could hardly be in the same position, their knowledge of God in most cases must have remained in the stage of indefinite surmise.

Now is it this kind of knowledge that puts man in condition to be elevated to the supernatural order and makes him capable of salvation? Certainly not; all theologians agree on this point. But if it does not enable the soul to receive the sanctifying grace, no more does it produce that moral responsibility which is necessary for sin; and all theologians agree that there is no sin unless there is responsibility, that is to say, a full consciousness of the law and the intention of violating it. As for the condemnation of philosophical sin, Billot turns it into an argument for his thesis, arguing that its condemnation does not imply that the so-called philosophical sin is to be taken as a theological sin, but on the contrary that it is no sin at all. A

last objection may come from our reluctance to accept as moral a theory according to which men fully adult in body, and possessing the use of reason, may commit all kinds of hideous crimes and yet, because they lack a formal notion of God, be considered as not responsible and therefore not liable to punishment. Here Billot has a reply ready which shows the depths of his ingenuity. He says that such an objection arises solely because we conceive of morals as without religion, of ethics as based on nature with no relation to theology; that is the root of all evils. And, moreover, logic is logic, and a man must not shrink from the truth, whatever it be.

Apart from the importance of the problem itself, the attitude taken towards it by Cardinal Billot is a most significant and instructive manifestation of the process which is going on within Catholic theology today. It rests on an implicit acknowledgment that Catholic theology is in need of a radical revision in the light of history and of a philosophy more flexible than the rigid Thomistic intellectualism; but at the same time that such a revision is not to be made with open frankness, as the Modernists attempted to do, that it must appear neither as a break with the past nor as a surrender to the claims of modern science. The fact that Billot does his best to put his new theories under the patronage of Aquinas, and to present them as a simple restatement of the true doctrines purified from the incrustations accumulated by shortsighted theologians, or as logical deductions from venerable principles of undisputed validity, is a clear indication of the method deemed suitable for the purpose. But what has led Catholic theologians like Cardinal Billot to such a realization?

As we have already noticed, the problem of the eternal destiny of unbelievers depends for its solution upon the more fundamental problem of whether a knowledge of God is able to reach the individual man left to his reason alone, and if so what kind of knowledge. Billot has appealed to history on this point, and has found out that *secundum modum inventionis* man can reach only a vague surmise, an indefinite idea of God which is not even sufficient to make a man morally responsible. A definite and formal idea of God is acquired by man *secundum*

modum disciplinae; but as Billot is not a traditionalist, and does not believe in innate ideas, the pedagogical method necessarily presupposes revelation. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Billot's faith in the validity of the metaphysical arguments is shaken, and that he is turning towards a sentimental theology; on the contrary it is against such a theology that he indirectly polemizes. If he disparages reason, it is not in behalf of conscience, quite the opposite, but only in behalf of external revelation.

Catholic theology entrenched itself behind Thomistic intellectualism as a rampart against the attacks of modern philosophy; but it seems that some theologians are beginning to realize that solitude, even in a stronghold, hardly befits a doctrine which has set as its goal the conquest of the world. They are fully aware that modern philosophy has lost all interest in the metaphysical frame of their theology, and that the masses are not accessible to metaphysics at all; and it has finally dawned upon them that a theology which by logical deduction reaches conclusions morally absurd and then takes refuge in the mystery and unknowable purposes of God, is not a theology that longer appeals to modern minds and modern consciences. Even a conservative theologian like Billot cannot escape the influences of his environment and the tendencies of the times. The demand today is for a more intelligent and substantial realization in the world of the principles and ideals of justice. It is in the name of racial and economic justice that Europe is hopelessly struggling to rearrange its political and economic life; in the name of justice every nation is revising its social legislation; in the name of the divine justice Cardinal Billot has begun to revise the conclusions of Catholic theology relating to original sin and the eternal destiny of unbelievers.

Cardinal Billot knows that his contentions will be sharply attacked by those theologians of various shades who are always ready for trouble and have lynx eyes to discover heresy in everything carrying a flavor of novelty. For them he has written the latest chapter of his treatise. It is a very able *apologia pro domo sua*, in which, after a clear summary of his reasons for departing from certain theological traditions

founded on erroneous premises, he emphasizes the fact that the question of the unbelievers had never before been approached in direct fashion, and that there was no definite and consistent tradition concerning it. The tradition begins now with Cardinal Billot himself, and he is quite right in ending with an appeal from the theologians of yesterday insufficiently informed "*aux théologiens de demain mieux avertis et plus complètement informés*" (Études, vol. 169, p. 407).

IV

In his latest chapter Cardinal Billot urges strongly that modern studies in the history of religions have made it impossible for apologists to use, as they have done from earliest times, the famous argument of the eternity of Christianity, that is, of the existence of a Christian revelation in the heathen world before Christ. That has been a favorite topic not only with apologists and great preachers, especially of the last century, but also with the Catholic writers of theological treatises, *De vera religione* and *De Ecclesia*. Such is not the case with the new book of the Jesuit Michael D'Herbigny, *Theologica de Ecclesia. I. De Deo universos evocante ad sui regni vitam, seu de institutione Ecclesiae primaeva: II. De Deo Catholicam Ecclesiam organice vivificante, seu de hodierna Ecclesiae agnitione*, Paris, 1920, 1921.

It has been remarked that in the systematization of modern Catholic theology the chapter *De Ecclesia* has become the central point from which the whole theology receives its light and in which finally converge all the lines of development. The treatise *De Ecclesia*, as it is found in modern books of Catholic theology, is of relatively recent formation. In ancient theology the doctrine about the Church developed from the question, 'Where is the Church?' in modern times the question is, 'Whether there is a Church?' The whole ground of inquiry is changed. Since the sixteenth century the various parts of this doctrine have received more attention, and only in the nineteenth century was a systematization of them made, in close connection with the treatise *De vera religione*, of which after all the discussion of the Church is the logical complement.

Father D'Herbigny is well known for his competence in matters of the theology and history of the Russian Church. He has published a sympathetic spiritual biography of Soloviev (*Un Newman Russe: Vladimir Soloviev*, Paris, 1911), and recently he has contributed to *Les Études* a series of noteworthy articles on the religious situation in Russia and on the necessity of definitely organizing the Catholic Church in that country not according to the Latin rite but to the Slavic, duly respecting all traditions and liturgical customs which do not contradict any essential point of Catholic dogma. This remark about D'Herbigny is necessary because his recent book has the evident purpose of providing a sound treatise *De Ecclesia* for theologians and students of theology who received their first education in non-catholic schools or who are expected to minister among populations of schismatics, especially among those belonging to the Russian and other eastern Orthodox churches.

Departing from the method followed in similar treatises by other theologians (Wilmers, Pesch, Hurter, Mazzella, and Billot) whose works on the Church were written to help their students in their examinations (*pro sua erga auditores immediatos benignitate, esotericam praecipue utilitatem ad examen pericula superanda intendebant*, I, p. 10), D'Herbigny not only combines the speculative and the historical method, but actually gives more space and more importance to the history than to the exposition of the doctrine itself. This method he thinks more adapted *ad psychologiam inquiringentium mentem* (p. 5).

It cannot be said that this book contains any new contribution to ecclesiological doctrines, except in the arrangement of the material and in the form in which the various doctrines are formulated. It is interesting to notice that on the question of the eternal destiny of unbelievers D'Herbigny, after stating the accepted general principle of invincible ignorance, refuses to make any further statement, alleging the warning given by Pope Pius IX (December 9, 1854): "*Nunc vero quis tantum sibi arroget ut huiusmodi ignorantiae designare limites queat iuxta populorum, regionum, ingeniorum, aliarumque rerum tam multarum rationem et varietatem?*" But he does not hesitate to mani-

fest his skepticism as to the possibility of salvation for heretics and schismatics because of the difficulty of their remaining undisturbed in the state of *male informata conscientia*. As a matter of fact, as he points out, almost all Christian sects have retained in their symbols of faith the article on the unity of the Church, which implies the principle that outside the Church there is no salvation. And it ought to be relatively easy for an intelligent person to see where and which is the true Church: there are the external signs, the *notae ecclesiae*, which can hardly be missed or misunderstood. For the benefit of non-catholic souls D'Herbigny calls attention to another visible sign of the true Church which is still more easily recognizable, namely, the spirit and practice of propagandism: "*Propagandismi absentia sufficit ut jam cognoscatur ibi non esse legitimam Christi Ecclesiam mentemque ubi societas Christianorum quaelibet acatholica zelo non ardeat pro conversione mundi*" (I, p. 135). That is meant not only for the orthodox churches, whose missionary activities ceased long ago, but also for the Protestant churches, which during two centuries had no missions at all, then had some, but, as he holds, with political purposes, and have more now, but in which these "*severe ab ipsis protestantibus judicabantur.*"

Considering the aims of the author in writing this treatise it is rather surprising that he found it necessary to insist with much determination on some doctrines of secondary importance which on the one hand are only survivals of mediaeval claims and on the other are irreconcilable with modern mentality, and as such have been proscribed by all modern civilized nations, as for instance the doctrine of the *potestas judiciaria circa res externas*, that is, the power of the Church to inflict temporal punishments, like prison or exile, without interference from the civil power. A still worse example is the doctrine of religious intolerance: "*Charitas est,*" he says, "*ea quae dicitur intolerantia, ubi errori denegantur iura veritatis, vel ubi legitima missio Christi opponitur falsariis et pseudo-prophetis*" (I, p. 135).

In the historical exposition the author frequently employs a distinctly polemical tone hardly likely to win for his argument the assent of a fair-minded reader. Of course Father D'Her-

bigny could not be expected to accept any of the conclusions of biblical criticism on such vital questions as that of the institution of the church by Jesus, or the historical reconstruction of early Christianity with its prominent eschatological hopes and its dependence on the Hellenistic environment; but the dogmatic tone (made worse by the crabbed Latin of his scholastic form) in which all modern theories are rather summarily dismissed, while it may bear witness to the strong faith and convictions of the author, must at the same time produce a repellent effect on the student not trained to rest comfortably on the *verba magistri*. But it is an advantage and a sign of the times that these theories are not ignored altogether. On the contrary there are in this book frequent quotations from non-catholic authors when their opinion agrees with the Catholic tradition. Harnack especially is largely exploited, and his name appears almost as often as that of St. Augustine and more often than that of Monsignor Batiffol.

The attention given by D'Herbigny to questions which have a special importance for the Orthodox churches and the references to opinions and books of Russian and Greek theologians give distinction to this treatise, and make it useful for the student who lacks first-hand knowledge of the sources. No complete and satisfactory history of Orthodox theology has been written in any of the western European languages or in Latin; D'Herbigny could supply this gap, and would so render a great service to scholars.

Ecclesiology is also the primary subject with which Monsignor Batiffol deals in *Le Catholicisme de St. Augustin* (Paris, 1920), a continuation of his two previous volumes, *L'Église naissante et le Catholicisme* and *La Paix Constantinienne et le Catholicisme*. The present work differs from these in being more decidedly a book of theology than a book of history. Its purpose is polemic, aiming at a radical refutation of the assumption of some modern historians who consider Augustine as the real founder of western Catholicism. Far from being the founder of the Catholic system, Augustine as interpreted by Batiffol was the faithful continuator of the tradition which goes back to the early Church, and his original contribution to

Christianity is "*d'avoir fait du Catholicisme non plus seulement une intelligence, non plus seulement une unité mais une mystique*" (p. 548).

Against the common opinion that Augustine considered the Church as the rule of faith, and assigned to Scripture a dependent place, according to the famous passage, "*Ego vero evangelio non crederem, nisi me Catholicae Ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas*," Batiffol concludes that the real teaching of Augustine is that both the authenticity of Scripture and the divine character of the Church are proved by independent historical arguments, and that therefore the Scripture is the source of faith, but that it is supported also by the independent authority of the Church: "*Pour Augustin dans le plan d'une logique rigoureuse l'autorité de l'Église ne fait pas l'autorité de l'Évangile, et si elle la confirme ce n'est qu'autant qu'elle ne dépend pas elle-même de l'Évangile*" (p. 25).

Did Augustine teach the doctrine about the dogmatic development which is commonly attributed to Vincent of Lerins? Batiffol thinks so, on the evidence of the passage: "*Aperitur quod clausum erat et cognoscitur quod latebat*," but the illustrations of this principle as understood by Augustine seem to suggest that such a development would not go much farther than the external terminology: "*Sunt enim et doctrinae religionis congruentes verborum novitates*." Whether this is enough to affirm with Batiffol that "*Augustin a compris le développement incomparablement mieux que Vincent de Lerins*" (p. 40), may reasonably be doubted.

The position taken by Augustine in the Donatist controversy and the various stages through which his doctrine on the Church as *corpus Christi mixtum* took definite shape are analyzed in detail, with the conclusion that in Augustine's thought the *Ecclesia Catholica* with its universality and unity is such by virtue of a divine design revealed in Scripture, which gives the evidence of its being the Church of God. The Pelagian controversy is treated at length in three long chapters, especially from the point of view of how the ecclesiological doctrine was affected in its fundamental principles and in its development by the theories and the conduct of Augustine and

of his opponents during the long period of that epoch-making struggle. A few pages on the authority of Augustine, "*Du danger qu'elle court et qu'elle peut faire courir*" (pp. 529 ff.), assign a high value in the history of Augustinian theology to the *Capitula* appended to the Epistle of Pope Celestinus and attributed to the Roman deacon Leo, later pope. The *Capitula* warn theologians to follow faithfully the decision of the apostolic see, disregarding if necessary even the teaching of those *inter magistros nostros* who have exceeded in certain points. Batiffol refers the phrase to Augustine, and concludes that "*la vertu du Catholicisme latin fut de modérer la passion et des admirateurs et des détracteurs d'Augustin*" (p. 531).

In his book *L'Église naissante* Mgr. Batiffol, analyzing the famous passage of Cyprian: "*Ecclesiam principalem unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est*," assigned to the word *principalem* the meaning 'first in authority.' But in his *Saint Augustin* Batiffol has changed his mind, and accepts the interpretation 'first in date' (p. 102). Of this conversion *in peius* A. D'Alès complains in "*La Théologie de Saint Cyprien*," Paris, 1922, which is the most recent volume of the *Bibliothèque de Théologie Historique publiée sous la direction des professeurs de théologie à l'Institut Catholique de Paris*. This Bibliothèque, which during the Modernist repression had the sad experience of seeing two of its best volumes (Turmel, *Histoire de la Théologie positive*, I, 1904; II, 1905) put on the Index, contains three other volumes by Father D'Alès: *La Théologie de Tertullien* (1905), *La Théologie de Saint Hippolyte* (1906), *L'Édit de Calliste; étude sur les origines de la pénitence chrétienne* (1914). The importance of Cyprian's theology is limited in the main to his teaching about the Church. Cyprian, remarks D'Alès, was not a creative genius, but rather a man of action, whose contribution to the metaphysics of dogma is very small, "*et ces contributions ne sont pas toujours heureuses*." But they show an intense Christian life enlightened by the brilliancy of faith and nourished by prayer. The most complete expression of this interior life is to be found in the treatise *De Dominica Oratione*, "*commentaire de la prière chrétienne par excellence*."

The famous passage of *De Catholicae Ecclesiae Unitate* con-

taining the statement about Peter's primacy, "*primatus Petro datur*," is submitted again to a searching analysis resulting in an agreement with Dom Chapman (*Revue Bénédictine*, 1902 and following years) against Benson's *Cyprian, His Life, Times, Works*, 1897, that both redactions of the text are the work of Cyprian himself. The first is the original form, as it was written when the treatise was directed against the African schism of Felicissimus, the second redaction, with the words about Peter's primacy, represents the revision of Cyprian when he sent the same treatise to Rome in opposition to the schism of Novatian. D'Alès brings virtually no new contribution to the solution of this question, but by putting together numerous passages of Cyprian's writings which show the coherence of his general thinking about Peter with that of the discussed passage, the author enables the reader to draw his own conclusion on this point, — although, we observe, it may be not in full agreement with that of Fr. D'Alès himself: "*De ce faisceau de témoignages, il ressort incontestablement, que selon la pensée de saint Cyprien l'évêque de Rome occupe dans l'Église une position unique: héritier du siège de Pierre, fondement permanent de l'Église, centre et source de l'unité, pasteur universel et primat, dépositaire du pouvoir des clefs*" (p. 129). But after having reached such a conclusion D'Ales, as if afraid of having gone too far, takes a step backward by admitting that Cyprian's ecclesiology gives room for opposite interpretations: "*D'ailleurs sa théorie marquée au coin de circonstances particulières peut être diversement comprise selon qu' on l'abord par tel ou tel biais*" (p. 214).

But the greatest difficulty against the admission of such a view of Cyprian's teaching as to the Roman primacy is the conduct of Cyprian himself in the famous baptismal controversy, in which he not only refused to the end to yield to the Roman decision, but used against Pope Stephen a firm and outspoken, and at times even violent, language. At this point D'Alès admits frankly that in the teaching of Cyprian there are some gaps of which he himself was not aware but which appeared clearly when his doctrine was put to the test: "*Qu'il s'agisse de l'Église, des évêques, ou du pape, on retrouve constam-*

ment chez Cyprien les mêmes affirmations avec les mêmes lacunes. . . . Mais par la force des choses ce danger devait se révéler tôt ou tard" (pp. 209-210). As a consequence Cyprian, after having paid the most eloquent homage to the Roman Church, did not draw the logical conclusions of his own principles, and this was the great mistake of his life: "*Après avoir rendu d'éloquents hommages à la foi indéfectible de l'Église romaine, après avoir même, chose plus considérable, reconnu la constitution monarchique de l'Église fondée sur Pierre, Cyprien se dérobe devant les conséquences*" (p. 200). And finally, at the end of his book, D'Alès feels the need of softening still more his tone in a brief characterization of Cyprian as "*l'homme de l'attachement indéfectible à l'Église et même, dans une large mesure, l'homme de l'attachement au principe de l'unité romaine. Mais faute d'avoir mesuré avec précision les exigences de ce principe, il contribua, pour une part, à ébranler d'une main ce qu'il édifiait de l'autre*" (p. 379).

The tendency, and we may even say the necessity, in which D'Alès finds himself of projecting into the third century the implications of a dogmatic development which is relatively recent, accounts for these hesitations and successive restrictions in his appreciation of Cyprian's ecclesiology. He even feels the need of warning us that "papal infallibility has nothing to do with the Cyprianic controversy because in the eyes of Cyprian the decision of the pope had not the character of a sentence from which there was no appeal" (p. 200), and that the pope as a private person may become a heretic: "*il pourrait arriver que le Pape quittât l'Église. Cette thèse, perdue de vue par tel théologien en rupture d'orthodoxie, est catholique et certaine.*" But, after all, he declares that in the solution of this question it is not his intention to appeal to the argument from infallibility: "*D'ailleurs nous ne la ferons pas intervenir dans la solution de la question présente*" (p. 210).

D'Herbigny on the contrary (vol. II, pp. 168-169) prefers to present Cyprian as having submitted at least partially and somewhat changed his mind: "*Mutat tamen suam sententiam Cyprianus ad obedientiam partialem. Nam ne de fide differat a Romano Pontifice admittit invaliditatem baptismi haeretici non*

pertinere ad catholicam regulam, sicut olim docuerat," but in the end agrees with D'Alès, that Cyprian had not a definite idea of the nature and the extent of the Roman primacy, and that "*praxis doctrinae priori minus cohaesit.*"

The same combination of speculative, historical, and polemical theology followed by D'Herbigny in his *De Ecclesia* is adopted by Maurice de la Taille S. J., recently appointed professor at the Gregorian University in Rome, in his imposing monograph, *Mysterium Fidei, De augustissimo Corporis et Sanguinis Christi Sacrificio atque Sacramento. Elucidationes L. In tres libros distinctae* (Paris, 1921). This book not only departs from the traditional mode of exposing the Eucharistic doctrine, by the adoption of a new arrangement of the theological material and by giving to the historical analysis a very large place, but is really a remarkable systematization of the theology of the Mass, a work that had never before been attempted in a direct and complete way. The first part deals with the Last Supper in itself and in its relations to the passion, resurrection, and glorification of Jesus (I–XV); the second with the Mass as a sacrifice (XVI–XXXV); the third with the Sacrament in its relations to the sacrifice and to redemption (XXXVI–L). From the early fathers to the great mediaeval doctors and to the more modern theologians, all the centuries, all the churches, all the theological schools and systems, are called upon by the author to bear witness to the true Catholic doctrine whether by confirming it or by being convicted of error.

From the strictly Catholic point of view, the *Mysterium Fidei* of Father de la Taille is a Eucharistic encyclopaedia which leaves little to be desired; from the scholarly point of view, apart from theological implications, it is an inexhaustible mine of historical and patristic information. Naturally these are used by the author, and very skilfully, for his apologetic and doctrinal purposes, and the historian must not forget that fact in perusing this most useful book. It is interesting also to notice that this treatise is not *ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis*, but on the contrary aims at including the whole tradition of the Church gathered in an orthodox unity. "*Pereant systemata, quae sunt ruina theologiae*" repeats de la Taille after

Cardinal Billot,⁵⁴ but warns us immediately that "*aliud est systema aliud corpus doctrinae*" (p. 8).

No less interesting is the strong mystical spirit in which the whole book is written; it contributes strikingly to produce the impression that this *corpus doctrinae* has a deeper unity and a more consistent continuity than would appear in a simple dogmatic or historical exposition.

V

Catholic theology in these last years has turned in a notable way towards a mystical inspiration, and has emphasized the old conception that theology is "*scientia quaedam speculativa veritatis revelatae, sed eatenus revelatae quatenus conduceret ad finem fovendae pietatis.*" Batiffol's *Saint Augustin* is also very significant from this point of view, inasmuch as the whole ecclesiological teaching of the great African is presented as "*une mystique*" and Augustine himself as the man who "*a eu plus qu'aucun de tous les docteurs l'intuition affectueuse de la présence et de l'action de Dieu dans l'Église*" (p. 548).

Since the seventeenth century, when mystical doctrines and practices reached a high point and led to the condemnation of Molinos and Petrucci and later of Fénélon, the Catholic Church has looked with a kind of distrust at all attempts at new speculative ventures in the unstable field of mystical theology. The restoration of scholasticism has probably something to do with the present revival of interest in both the doctrinal and the practical side of mystical experience. Thomistic scholasticism with its prominent intellectualistic character is not conducive to mysticism: it is true, however, that most of the great scholastics were at the same time great mystics, but their mysticism was not a direct product of their scholastic mental habit or a derivation from the rational substratum of their theology. It was rather a kind of superstructure based on higher principles than those of their intellectual activity, and prompted by different motives; for it was founded exclusively on divine grace and divine will both as the point of departure and as the issue of the whole process. As such it differed essentially from the

mystical spirit of the Pseudo-dionysian tradition, which assumed a more definite philosophical aspect. But precisely on account of its super-rational character, mysticism in the life of the great scholastics was at the same time a reaction against and a complement of their theology. Since it appeased the craving for a more emotional element in their spiritual life and at the same time did justice to the emotional and voluntary powers which within the iron frame of an intellectualistic theology were kept in a subordinate place and restricted to a relatively unimportant rôle.

The same forces are probably at work in modern scholastic circles;⁵⁵ but there is no doubt that this mystical revival in Catholic theology is due also to certain specific tendencies of modern thought which are a product of the contemporary strong reaction against the positivistic trend of the second half of the nineteenth century as well as of external influences. The effects of this new wave of Catholic mysticism are already visible not only in certain new phases of ecclesiastical and monastic discipline and in a renewed intensity of liturgical life, but also in the publication of a large devotional literature and of special systematic treatises of mystical and ascetic theology, and in a very promising historical activity in the critical reconstruction of the biographies and the teaching of the prominent mystics of the various centuries.⁵⁶

This branch of theology is still in process of elaboration, and consequently shows much uncertainty and gives room to conflicting views on many fundamental points. Its systematization, however, will be more difficult than that of any other branch of theology, first of all because it is not so easy to define the essentials of mysticism on scriptural authority or on the authority of tradition as it is in dogmatics, and, secondly, because the individual psychological element which plays so great a part in mystical experience, is so recalcitrant to generalizations as to make extremely difficult the necessary work of classification even on a loose scientific basis. But even if such a classification is made by the methods of modern psychological research, there remains always the imponderable element of divine grace, which, coming from a source beyond the categories

of logic and causality, defies all the limitations which pertain to a system.

The tendency in many Catholic circles is to bring together all the elements belonging both to the principles of common ascetic practice and to the theories and results of high mystical experience, and to coördinate them in a broad unity, covering the whole process of interior perfection, under the general title of "theology of the spiritual life." Through this procedure what was really the proper domain of mysticism becomes only one part, and the highest, of the whole systematization: it is placed on the boundary line, where the system ceases to apply and the unknown begins. The question, however, is not one of methodical arrangement only, but of principle, that is to say of whether the mystical experience is only a gradual and more intensive realization of the life of grace to which all Christians are bound to aspire, or whether it is a new and specific stage above the ordinary practice of virtue and so reserved for those whom God has chosen for his special gifts. A survey of the various opinions in Catholic mystical circles may be found in a very valuable article of Alois Mayer, '*Mystik und Katholizismus*,' in *Die Tat*, 1921; a more methodical and systematic attempt at a classification appeared in the *Revue Apologétique* (1921) under the title '*État actuel des études mystiques*.'⁵⁷

Most of the Catholic periodicals of philosophy and religious studies publish occasional articles on topics of asceticism and mysticism, but only a few reviews have chosen this as their specific field. The two most important are *La Vie Spirituelle*, published since January 1919, by the Dominicans of the Collegium Angelicum of Rome and the *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*, published by the French Jesuits since January 1920. The former has given much of its space to illustrating the teaching of Aquinas on the spiritual life in his *Secunda secundae*, and to initiating the work of systematization on Aquinas' principles. So far, however, the work has made more progress on its negative side by attempts to clear the field of prejudices and objections than in a positive and constructive direction. The program and the directing principles of this review are clearly stated by Garrigou-Lagrange.⁵⁸

The Jesuit French review shows a more eclectic spirit, and puts, as is natural, great weight on the principles and practices of the spiritual life traditional in the Society from the time of its founder. A very instructive article by J. de Guibert in the first issue (*'Les Études de théologie ascétique et mystique: comment les comprendre?'*) outlines the program of the review and insists on the insufficiency of the Thomistic data for the needs of modern mystical theology.⁵⁹ No less noteworthy is the emphasis laid upon the necessity of psychological analysis, historical research, and elaboration of the material coming from those two sources "*pour en réaliser ensuite la mise en oeuvre théologique*" (p. 19).

Although, as is obvious, the time is not ripe for a comprehensive work on ascetic and mystical theology,⁶⁰ yet there have already appeared some general treatises, especially for the use of theological students. The most popular is that of F. Naval, first published in Spanish and recently translated into Latin, *Theogiae asceticae et mysticae cursus ad usum Seminariorum, Institutorum religiosorum clericorum, necnon moderatorum animarum. Versio latina iuxta 2am ed. hisp. a I. Fernandez*, 1920. Notwithstanding all its deficiencies of method and regrettable historical gaps and its peculiarly Spanish color⁶¹ the work of Naval is a remarkable contribution to the speculative theology of mysticism and will at least serve as a basis for discussion. In so far as concerns the method of classification and exposition of the material of ascetic and mystical theology, the schematic outline of a course published by A. Tanquerey in the *Revue*⁶² is more coherent and as a whole preferable to the method of Naval: it remains to be seen whether Tanquerey's scheme would give the same impression when fully developed in the form of a theological treatise.

While on its speculative side mystical theology is still in search of the best path to a systematization, historical studies of asceticism and mysticism have become very prominent; articles and monographs in reviews, as well as books, continually throw new light on phases and personalities of the long mystical succession. An attempt to write the whole history of spiritual life has even been made by P. Pourrat, under the

title, *La spiritualité chrétienne*, of which two volumes have already appeared: I. *Des origines de l'Église au Moyen Âge*, 4th ed. 1920; II. *Le Moyen Âge*, 1921.⁶³ The author confesses that his history is only a preliminary attempt, as the time for an historical synthesis has not come, any more than for a doctrinal synthesis:

Je n'ai pas voulu tout dire. Les richesses de l'antiquité chrétienne sont considérables, l'inventaire détaillé en serait démesurément long. Faire connaître les auteurs anciens, exposer leur doctrine d'après leurs écrits, grouper et caractériser les divers enseignements ascétiques et mystiques de chacune des périodes étudiées, tel a été mon but.

With such a program it is natural that many questions of great importance, like that of the origin of asceticism and of the non-christian mystical traditions, have been only mentioned by the author, with no attempt to solve them, and that he indulges too much in gathering around specific personalities or environments (especially monastic) theories and practices of various origin and value. But the work of Pourrat is indispensable for the historian of Christian doctrine.

Among the many monographs that of Father P. Dudon S. J., *Le Quiétiste espagnol Michel Molinos (1628-1696)*, Paris, 1921, is noteworthy. It embodies the results of long research in archives and libraries, with study of manuscripts and publications of which little had been known, and this has enabled the author to reconstruct the life of this famous adventurer in the mystic realm, from its obscure beginnings in the little village of Muniesa through his amazing success in Rome as a spiritual director and master of ascetics to the tragic catastrophe and Molinos' pitiful end in the prison of the Inquisition, after a secret trial the original documents of which are still buried in the secret archives of the Holy Office so that they could not be consulted by the author. He was, however, so fortunate as to discover in the Vallicelliana in Rome some extracts from the original documents, made by one of the summists of the Inquisition, from which it appears that Molinos was convicted of immoral practices indulged under the cover of mystical experiences, and likewise of heretical doctrines contained in his published Guide and more explicitly in a large number

of private letters written to correspondents from all parts of Italy and France seeking spiritual advice and mystical instruction.

Father Dudon concludes his book by the remark that self-renunciation is the whole basis of the mystical life, and prayer its nourishment. But prayer need not necessarily be contemplative: "*quand il voulut formuler, en un mot, la loi de la marche à sa suite jusqu'aux plus hauts sommets des cieux, le Christ n'indiqua pas un mode spécial de prière; il dit simplement: Si quis vult post me venire, abneget semetipsum*" (p. 270).

In these words lies a discreet allusion to a controversy that has been going on for some time among Catholic theologians regarding the value and the fitness for a more intense spiritual life of the various forms of prayer. One phase of this controversy led to a somewhat sharp exchange of views between the Benedictines, who by tradition and by the spirit of their institution are more addicted to liturgical prayer, and the Jesuits, who for similar reasons are more devoted to meditation and individual prayer, in accordance with the method outlined by Loyola in his *Spiritual Exercises*.⁶⁴

VI

Liturgical studies have been always in great honor among the Benedictines, and it is due to their constant efforts, especially since the initiative taken by Dom Guéranger of the abbey of Solesmes, that the theory and history of liturgies has taken a prominent place in the ecclesiastical disciplines. The recent large development of the comparative study of religions has added a new interest to liturgiology, and liturgical history has become a fruitful field of research, throwing much light on the origin and early development of Christianity, and still more on the history of dogma. Among the many publications on liturgical problems which have appeared in these last years, the two collections started by initiative of the Benedictines of the Abbey of Maria Laach, deserve special mention, *Liturgiegeschichtliche Quellen* and *Liturgiegeschichtliche Forschungen*,

both under the direction of Dom K. Mohlberg of the same abbey and Dr. A. Rucker of the University of Breslau. In the *Quellen* was published first (1918) by Dom Mohlberg the Gelasian Sacramentary, *Das frankische Sacramentarium Gelasianum in alamannischer Überlieferung: St. Galler Sakramentarforschungen I*. The Codex Sangallensis No. 348 had already been used, especially by Wilson (*The Gelasian Sacramentary*, Oxford, 1894), but it is now published in its integrity.⁶⁵ Historically more important is the so-called Gregorian Sacramentary, of which in the same collection H. Lietzmann gives a new edition (*Das Sacramentarium Gregorianum nach dem Aachener Ur exemplar*, 1921). Lietzmann attempts the reconstruction of the original text sent by Pope Hadrian to Charlemagne. The chief materials for this are the manuscript of Cambrai No. 159, of early ninth century, supposed to come directly from the *authenticum* kept at that time in the imperial library of Aquisgrana, and the Vatican Ottob. 313, also of the ninth century. The importance of such a reconstruction is obvious, for it will make it possible to follow more closely the process of reworking which the Sacramentary suffered in the Gallican churches before it was brought back to Rome, where in its turn it influenced the local liturgy by introducing practices and peculiarities of Gallican origin. It will be of great use also in tracing the text of the Roman pre-hadrianic *Liber Sacramentorum*, now represented by the *Sacramentarium Gelasianum*, which, however, being not older than the late seventh or early eighth century, and representing also a Gallican redaction, is far from reliable, and by the so-called *Sacramentarium Leonianum*, which in a fragmentary state exists in only one manuscript (Verona, Library of the Chapter), and evidently does not contain an official text but simply a collection of prayers and masses for private purposes, taken from various sources and compiled, it would seem, after the time of Gregory the Great.⁶⁶

In the *Forschungen*, Dom Mohlberg has published a short but accurate introduction to liturgical studies, *Ziele und Aufgaben der liturgiegeschichtlichen Forschung*, 1919, with an historical outline of their various phases and a very useful

bibliography of sources and monographs. Of peculiar importance for the history of early Christianity as well as of the cults of the hellenistic period are the two substantial monographs of Professor Franz J. Dolger of Münster, *Die Sonne der Gerechtigkeit und der Schwarze*, 1919, and *Sol Salutis, Gebet und Gesang im christlichen Altertum*, 1920.

It cannot be denied that theological studies in the Catholic Church are in a period of remarkable activity, less conspicuous in the field of speculation than in that of historical reconstruction, but no less significant. While in the main the conservative and polemical tendency is strong in both, at the same time they show unmistakably a feeling of unrest and anxiety on account of the difficult situation caused for theology by modern science. The need of a new apologetic theology with sympathetic understanding and frank respect for scientific progress is badly felt, but the scientific field has grown so large, and requires so much specialization, that no theologian can even think of covering it with such a detailed analysis as would make possible the search for an apologetic synthesis. History, on the contrary, appears more accessible; it leaves more room for differences of opinion, and is not recalcitrant to brilliant generalizations carrying more or less conviction according to the literary and artistic skill of the historian. Between high theological speculation with its iron bars and its metaphysical depths on one side and the highly specialized research of the experimental sciences on the other, history offers to many a line of less resistance. That may explain why writers of history are many, though historians are few. But the average theologian who has read his Aquinas in a *Synopsis ad mentem S. Thomae* is perfectly satisfied, and enjoys for the rest of his life the harmless exercise of deducing syllogistically pious corollaries from his axiomatic premises without concerning himself with what experience has to say about his conclusions.

It is not so with those who possess wings for flight and the right training for speculation: sooner or later they come to the realization that theology is not a game of chess with nothing

at stake, but carries with it life or death for such a specific form of higher religion as is Catholicism. And they feel the call of the time, and do not hide their anxiety to understand and to be understood. Where there is struggle there is life: *Qui descendunt mare in navibus facientes operationem in aquis multis ipsi viderunt opera Domini et mirabilia eius in profundo* (Ps. 106, 23).

NOTES

1. "Depuis trois siècles environ, le travail purement scholastique n'a produit aucun chef-d'oeuvre saillant," J. Bellamy, *La Théologie Catholique au XIXe siècle*, 2d ed., Paris, 1904, p. 188. This book is far from being a complete and satisfactory history of Catholic theology in the last century. It is rather a series of detached chapters covering special phases of the development. This is partly due to the death of the author before the book was finished, partly to the lack of more complete information, and partly also to the state of uncertainty and hesitation in theological circles during the first years of the twentieth century.

2. For the influence of Descartes on the theologians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see: K. Werner, *Geschichte der katholischen Theologie. Seit dem Trienter Concil bis zum Gegenwart*, München, 1866, and G. Saitta, *Le origini del Neo-Tomismo*, Bari, 1912, cap. II, pp. 17 ff.

3. On Malebranche see: Ollé-Laprune, *La philosophie de Malebranche*, Paris, 1870, and Joly, *Malebranche*, in the series entitled *Les Grands Philosophes*, Paris, 1901.

4. In France the greater part of the clergy were Gallicans, and the textbooks on theology were that of Bailly (openly Jansenist) and the so-called *Théologie de Toulouse* (no less Jansenist and Gallican). In Germany, Austria, and Northern Italy the theological seminaries instituted by Joseph II at Vienna, Fribourg, Pesth, Pavia, and Louvain were centres of incredulity: "L'enseignement dogmatique et exégétique y était imprégné de rationalisme. . . . Les professeurs d'histoire enseignaient d'après les manuels de leurs collègues protestants et le droit canonique n'était qu'une machine de guerre destinée à battre en brèche l'autorité de la Papauté," Kannengieser, *Les origines du vieux catholicisme*, Paris, 1900, p. 63; see Bellamy, *op. cit.*, chap. I.

5. *Réflexions sur l'état de l'Eglise en France pendant le dix-huitième siècle et sa situation actuelle*, Paris, 1808.

6. Expositions and refutations of Traditionalism are to be found in almost all modern treatises on Catholic dogmatic theology, for instance in Pohle-Preuss, *God, his Knowability, Essence, and Attributes*, 2d ed., St. Louis, Mo., 1914, pp. 44 ff. A more complete exposition of the Catholic point of view in J. V. Bainvel, *De Magisterio vivo et Traditione*, Paris, 1906. An exhaustive historical treatment of Traditionalism in the nineteenth century is still lacking.

7. On Ubaghs see Bellamy, *op. cit.*, chap II, pp. 29 ff., and *Revue des sciences ecclésiastiques*, 1876, XXXIV, pp. 541-552.

8. On German Catholic theology (Hermes, Günther, and the school of Tübingen) see the very important study of Edmond Vermeil, *Jean-Adam Möhler et l'école Catholique de Tubingue (1815-1840). Étude sur la théologie romantique en Wurtemberg et les origines germaniques du modernisme*, Paris, 1913. Also Saitta, *op. cit.*, cap. IV, V, and G. Goyau, *L'Allemagne religieuse: Le Catholicisme (1800-1848)*, II, Paris, 1905. By the same author also: Möhler, in the collection *La Pensée Chrétienne*, Paris, 1905.

9. Drey, *Kurze Einleitung in das Studium der Theologie, mit Rücksicht auf den wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt und das katholische System*, Tübingen, 1819, p. 5. Vermeil, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

10. The controversy between Gioberti and Rosmini has been presented in detail by G. Saitta in his book, *Il pensiero di Vincenzo Gioberti*, Messina, 1917, part II, chap. III, pp. 153-205. For the theological implications of Gioberti's system see in the same book, part I, chaps. III, IV, and passim. On Rosmini there is a large literature; see Sheldon, 'The Teaching of Rosmini' in *Papers of the American Society of Church History*, 1897, VIII; Orestano, *Rosmini*, in *Biblioteca pedagogica*, Rome, 1908; Palhories, *Rosmini*, in *Les Grands Philosophes*, Paris, 1908. The influence of Rosmini was very strong among a number of French and Belgian theologians and especially among the Sulpicians, as appears from the diary of the famous Père Hyacinthe Loyson in Houtin, *Le Père Hyacinthe dans l'Église Romaine (1827-1869)*, Paris, 1920. In 1851 Father Hyacinth writes as follows: "*Je trouvais dans l'Ontologisme la satisfaction de mon intelligence en même temps que l'aliment de mon cœur. L'Ontologisme unit le rationalisme le plus hardi au mysticisme le plus tendre, et il est pour moi une religion en même temps qu'une philosophie*" p. 64. The theological errors of Rosmini are exposed in *Rosminianarum Propositionum trutina theologica*, Rome, 1892, attributed to Cardinal Mazzella, against whom G. Morando wrote his *Esame critico delle XL Proposizioni Rosminiane condannate dalla S. R. U. Inquisizione*, Milan, 1905.

11. The revival of Scholasticism is usually connected with the name of Sanseverino of Naples and later with those of Liberatore, also from Naples, Kleutgen from Germany, Grandclaude from France, and others. In several articles in the *Rivista Neo-scolastica* Dr. Masnovo has directed attention to an earlier group of scholastics from which Italian neo-scholasticism takes its beginning. It seems that a Spanish Jesuit exiled from Spain in 1767 found a refuge in Piacenza and taught there Thomistic philosophy. His disciple and successor Bozzetti left in manuscript a course of scholasticism which in the judgment of Dr. Masnovo is very remarkable. His disciples Serafino and Domenico Sordi, two brothers who later entered the Society of Jesus, were fervent Thomists, and it was due to them that a movement started within the Society in favor of a scholastic restoration. See, in the *Rivista*, 1910, vol. II, 'Nuovi contributi alla storia del Neo-tomismo,' pp. 69 ff., and 1920, vol. XII, pp. 42-55.

12. Historical studies on Aquinas have become very prominent in the last thirty years. The works of Mandonnet, *Des écrits authentiques de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2d ed., Fribourg, 1910, of Michelitsch, *Thomasschriften: Untersuchungen und die Schriften Thomas' v. Aquino*, Graz, 1911, vol. I, are of capital importance. A complete bibliography is to be found in Mandonnet et Destrez, *Bibliographie Thomiste*, first volume of a *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, Le Saulchoir (Belgium), 1921, published by the Dominicans of the *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*. It contains an introduction summarizing the results of critical studies on the life and writings of Aquinas. The bibliography is exhaustive, but no attempt is made at a critical discrimination among the works listed.

13. In periodical literature the integralist Thomistic school is represented by the three Jesuit reviews, *La Civiltà Cattolica* of Rome, *Les Études* of Paris, and *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*. These periodicals, although they do not have the character of theological reviews, frequently publish articles on philosophical theological questions, mostly with polemical purpose. By the Jesuits of

the University of Innsbrück is published the *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, and by those of the Gregorian University of Rome the *Gregorianum* (since 1920). The *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie* founded in 1886 by E. Commer, who acquired some notoriety in connection with the *affaire Schell*, has several times changed its theological compass, but as a whole it may be fairly ranged among the most conservative theological reviews. The Dominicans publish the Thomistic reviews, *La Ciencia Tomista* of Madrid, *La Revue Thomiste* of Paris, and the *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* of Belgium. On the condition of theological studies and publications in the various countries may be consulted A. Vacant et E. Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Paris, of which there have already appeared six volumes, as far as the letter H.

14. The most important reviews of scholastic philosophy are the *Revue Néo-scholastique of Louvain*, the *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scholastica* of Milan, and the *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* of Fulda.

15. *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scholastica*, 1909, p. 297.

16. A complete bibliography of modern Catholic theology is to be found in H. Hurter, *Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae; Aetas recens, Pars II theologos complectens novissimos. Ab anno 1870-1910*, ed. 3, Innsbrück, 1913. For the years since 1910 see the *Bulletin de Théologie spéculative*, which is to be found in each volume of the *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* and in other theological reviews. Most of the textbooks on dogmatic theology have appeared in Germany, and a number of them are written in German. For a list and criticism of many of them see H. Kihn, *Encyclopädie und Methodologie der Theologie*, Freiburg, 1892, pp. 412-416.

17. Adam Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis hodiernis moribus accommodata*, 11th ed., 1907.

18. Joseph Pohle, *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik*. English translation by Arthur Preuss in a series of twelve volumes under the general title, *The Pohle-Preuss Series of Dogmatic Text-books*, St. Louis, Mo., 1914.

19. Tanquerey, *De Vera Religione, de Ecclesia, de Fontibus Theologicis*, p. 111.

20. The theological treatises of Cardinal Billot are the following: *De Verbo Incarnato*, ed. 4, 1905; *De Ecclesia Christi*, ed. 3, 1909; *De Deo Uno et Trino*, ed. 4, 1909; *De Ecclesiae Sacramentis*, ed. 4, 1907; *De Virtutibus infusis*, ed. 2, 1905; *Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati personalis*, ed. 3, 1908; *De inspiratione Sacrae Scripturae*, ed. 2, *Quaestiones de Novissimis*, ed. 3, *De immutabilitate Traditionis contra novam haeresim evolutionismi*, ed. 2, 1907; *De Gratia Christi et libero hominis arbitrio, Pars I*, 1908.

21. On these charges against Billot's Thomism, see Bellamy, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-156.

22. A history of the variations of Catholic scholars in biblical criticism is to be found in the two volumes of Albert Houtin, *La Question biblique au XIXe siècle*, Paris, 1902, and *La Question biblique au XXe siècle*, Paris, 1906. A survey of the points of Catholic doctrine especially affected by biblical and historical criticism in *Programme of Modernism* (English transl.), 1908; and in Tyrrell's *Mediaevalism*, 1909.

23. "Au milieu du XIXe siècle le P. Perrone enseignait au Collège romain [Gregorian University] que les exégètes catholiques devaient se soucier de la

critique juste ce qu'il fallait pour défendre le dogme. Au commencement du XXe siècle un professeur de la même institution disait fièrement à l'un de ses collègues: Il y a vingt ans que j'enseigne: mes élèves ignorent qu'il y ait une question biblique," Houtin, *op. cit.*, p. 198. This professor was Billot, as appears from Mgr. Touchet, *Lettre sur l'enseignement aux seminaristes*, 1903, quoted by Houtin.

24. The insufficiency of modern scholasticism to offer a sound basis for apologetics was one of the favorite topics of the Catholic anti-scholastics. See, for instance, E. Buonaiuti, 'Il Neo-Tomismo,' in *Rivista di Studi religiosi*, 1904, pp. 489-512; Tyrrell, *Lex Orandi*, London, 1904, Introduction; and Maurice Blondel, 'Histoire et dogme: les lacunes philosophiques de l'exégèse moderne,' in *Quinzaine*, 1904.

25. In France the pontifical wishes about the restoration of scholasticism were disregarded by a small group of Catholic philosophers, especially Oratorians, among whom the traditions of Malebranche and the more recent ones of Newman and Gratry were always alive, together with a strong dislike of scholasticism in all its forms. Laberthonnière continued this tradition and contributed frequently to the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, of which he was the editor for many years. In the same direction worked a group of laymen of the school of Ollé-Laprune, whose disciple was Maurice Blondel, the most original thinker of the whole group. Of the many writings of Blondel the most important is *L'Action. Essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de la pratique*, Paris, 1893. On the apologetic motive of his philosophy see his articles: 'Les exigences de la pensée contemporaine en matière d'apologétique et la méthode de la philosophie dans l'étude du problème religieux,' in *Annales*, 1895-1896. On this Catholic neo-kantian school, see Albert Leclerc, 'Le mouvement catholique kantien en France à l'heure présente,' in *Kantstudien*, Bd. VII, 1902; M. Hébert, *L'évolution de la foi catholique*, Paris, 1905; and E. Ménégoz, 'Le fidéisme et la notion de la foi,' in *Revue de Théologie et de Questions religieuses*, January 1905.

26. *Annales*, 1896, p. 600.

27. *L'Action*, p. 353.

28. *Lettre à l'Univers*, March 1, 1907.

29. Catholic apologetics still clings, and probably will for ever do so, to the old scheme, which may be presented as follows: Reason proves the existence of God; this God may reveal himself; history proves the fact of revelation, it proves also the authenticity of the Scripture and the authority of the Church; Catholicism is therefore founded on a rational basis which is truly scientific. See Buonaiuti, 'La Filosofia dell' Azione,' in *Rivista di Studi religiosi*, 1905, p. 228.

30. On these attacks, see H. Schell, *Selbstersetzung des Christenthums und die Religion der Zukunft*, 2d ed., Berlin, 1874. Still more violent were the attacks of Paulsen, *System der Ethik mit einem Umriss der Staats- und Gesellschaftslehre*, 4th ed., Berlin, 1894, against Catholic religious absolutism, and *Philosophia militans: gegen Klerikalismus und Naturalismus*, Berlin, 1901, against superstition and casuistry as the logical products of a religion based on external authority.

31. Schell inaugurated his literary career as a follower of the Aristotelian-Thomistic school with his book, *Die Einheit des Seelenlebens aus den Prinzipien*

der aristotelischen Philosophie, 1873. His study on the trinity, *Das Wirken des dreieinigen Gottes*, 1885, shows him still clinging to the Thomistic tradition. But the first two volumes of his *Katholische Dogmatik*, Paderborn, 1892-1893, reveal that he had already outgrown scholasticism, as appeared more clearly in the last two volumes of the same work, and much more in his great apologetic book, *Die göttliche Wahrheit des Christenthums*, 1895, and the two small books, *Der Katholicismus als Princip des Fortschritts*, 1897, *Die neue Zeit und der alte Glaube*, 1898, in which his denunciation of scholasticism as the cause of the decay of Catholic theology, and of ecclesiastical bureaucracy as the cause of all the evils of the Church, is very outspoken.

32. Schell submitted to the decree and kept silent till his death, May 31, 1906. But his disciples and friends fought for him, trying to defend his orthodoxy. A series of harsh polemic discussions followed his death, and *l'affaire Schell* became one of the thorns of German Catholicism for many years. For its various phases, down to 1907, see S. Minocchi, '*La Crisi odierna del Cattolicesimo in Germania*,' in *Studi religiosi*, 1907, pp. 491-538.

33. English translation under the title *Scholasticism Old and New*, 1910, p. 191. Professor De Wulf goes even farther than that by affirming: "The new Scholasticism is not a theology; the former might be entirely renewed while the latter remained quite stationary and uninfluenced, or vice versa. Indeed we are just now witnesses to a revolution in theology; but the very remarkable controversies of modern times upon biblical criticism and the inspiration of the Scriptures have little to do with philosophy" (p. 190). Fortunately for himself Professor De Wulf is not a theologian and not being such is not obliged to share the convictions of Pius X.

34. De Wulf has made noteworthy efforts to popularize his synthesis among students of philosophy by insisting on it in books and reviews, in lectures and debates in philosophical congresses; see for instance his article '*Western Philosophy and Theology in the Thirteenth Century*,' published in this REVIEW, October 1918, pp. 409-432. But he does not seem to have gained many followers outside of some scholastic circles. A radical criticism of his synthesis was published by Professor G. Gentile in *Critica*, 1905 (reprinted in his volume *Il Modernismo e i rapporti tra religione e filosofia*, 1909), to which De Wulf replied with an article '*Scolastica vecchia e nuova*' in the same *Critica* in 1911, provoking new remarks by Gentile, '*La Scolastica ed il Prof. De Wulf*,' July 1911. The question was taken up again by a former disciple of De Wulf, Bruno Nardi, '*Fatti e Commenti: Scolastica vecchia e nuova*,' in *Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica*, 1911, vol. III, 2, pp. 555-562, who concluded against De Wulf. See also De Ruggero, *La Filosofia contemporanea*, 2d ed., 1920, vol. I, pp. 202-204 (English translation).

35. *L'action intellectuelle et politique de Léon XIII*, Paris, 1902, p. 49.

36. *Scholasticism Old and New*, p. 168.

37. *Revue Thomiste*, 1909, p. 5; see also 1905, pp. 8-16.

38. On the question of Integralism vs. Syndicalism which embittered the last years of Pius X's pontificate see '*From Leo XIII to Benedict XV*,' in *American Journal of Theology*, April 1917.

39. Wladimirus Ledochowski, praepositus generalis S. J., *De doctrina S. Thomae magis magisque fovenda*, Curiae Rhaetorum, 1917. "The Jesuits," says this letter, "are not free to follow any doctrine received in the Church,

but according to their constitution they must regard Aquinas as their master." As a consequence they are not allowed to differ even slightly from Aquinas "in praecipuis eius doctrinae capitibus et quae tanquam fundamentum sunt aliorum plurimorum." These primary points are those concerning the theory of knowledge, the criterion of truth, and so on. As a rule, even in secondary questions, they must follow Aquinas: "*Filii Societatis ne in secundariis quaestionibus quidem a clara et certa sententia S. Thomae nonnisi gravate admodum et rarissime discedere licet.*"

40. In France neo-scholasticism has almost no representatives, in Germany very few. "It seems improbable that a Thomistic revival will acquire considerable vigor of expansion in a real German environment. Under present conditions it seems that the resistance is too great to be overcome, and that the general situation is too unfavorable. The strongest obstacle that the revival of the great metaphysical tradition encounters in France is a complex of ignorance and of prejudices inherited from the spirit of Cartesianism; that is a negative obstacle relatively easy to remove. But in Germany it has against it a whole intellectual formation opposed directly to Thomistic realism, and which is derived from Kantian idealism and from the presumption of revolving things only around the human mind." J. Maritain, '*Lo Stato attuale della Filosofia tedesca*,' in *Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica*, 1921, p. 318.

41. On theological studies in Louvain, see Bellamy: "*Au total aucun nom saillant n'émerge qui résume et incarne en lui un mouvement d'idées remarquable*," *op. cit.*, p. 173.

42. J. B. Hogan, *Clerical Studies*, 2d ed., Boston, 1905.

43. *Études*, vol. 161, p. 138.

44. The article of Perrin is written in a rather sarcastic mood which somewhat diminishes its importance. But if we may not take the writer seriously when he says that Billot's article "*pourrait être intitulé Le Massacre des théologiens*," there is no room for doubting that his historical survey of the problem is exact and exhaustive.

45. Perrin directs attention to the importance played from Alexander of Hales to Aquinas and his followers by the received axiom: "*Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*," which was adopted by the theologians who ignored its Abelardian origin, *op. cit.*, pp. 355-365.

46. The bull *Auctorem Fidei* against the Synod of Pistoia.

47. "*Parmi les dogmes de l'Eglise il n'en est peut-être pas un . . . qui a été à ce point défiguré et travesti par certain théologiens appartenant pour la plus part à l'époque de décadence que fut le dix-huitième siècle.*" By considering original sin as belonging to the same class of personal sin these theologians made of this dogma "*un amas de contradictions flagrantes, qu'en vérité aucune explication n'a pu, ne peut, et ne pourra à jamais faire disparaître*" (*Études*, vol. 162, p. 132).

48. An historical survey of the general question was made by Caperan, *Le Problème du salut des infidèles*, Paris, 1912. Billot mentions this book with great praise, while in the Theological Bulletin of the *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, vol. VII, 1913, p. 795, it is judged a worthless piece of work. Probably the Dominicans of the *Revue* are nearer the truth

than Cardinal Billot. But from the point of view of speculative theology little or nothing has been said on this particular point: "*Nous arrivons à une question qui n'a été ni débattue, ni examinée, ni même envisagée, autant du moins qu'on le peut conjecturer de la lecture de leurs écrits, par les maîtres de la théologie,*" *Études*, vol. 165, p. 515.

49. In Boetium de Trinitate, Q. 1, a. 3 ad 6um.

50. De natura deorum I, 17.

51. In primam partem Summae II, 1, p. 34, Venice, 1594.

52. "*Ad legem naturalem pertinent primo quidem quaedam praecepta communissima quae sunt omnibus nota. . . . Quantum ergo ad illa principia communia lex naturalis nullo modo potest a cordibus hominum deleri in universali,*" Summa Theol. I, II, 94, 6.

53. Arnaud, *Dénonciation du péché philosophique*, in *Oeuvres*, tom. XXXI.

54. Billot, *De Sacramentis*, I, p. 426.

55. Very significant on this point is a letter of Emilio Chiochetti, published in the *Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica*, 1917, in which the contrast between the aridity of scholastic culture and the great mystical tradition of the fathers is pointed out in a striking poetical mood rather unusual in modern scholastic circles (pp. 429-431).

56. The bibliography of ascetic and mystical theology is to be found scattered in various publications. Most of the important works are classified in the *Nomenclator* of Hurter under the various sections *Theologia practica, ascetica, mystica*, in the catalogues of writers belonging to the various religious orders, and in the bulletins of theological and philosophical periodicals, especially those of the *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*. A general repertory is still desired.

57. The contents of the article is as follows: 1. *Le mouvement des études mystiques. Le groupe Térésien.* 2. *Groupe ascético-mystique.* 3. *Groupe Dominicain.* 4. *Synthèse philosophico-mystique du Père Maréchal.* 5. *Synthèse théologico-mystique du Père de la Taille.* 6. *Problèmes actuels et questions de méthode par le Père de Guibert.* See also the important article of Garrigou-Lagrange, '*Le problème mystique actuel et les questions de méthode,*' in *Vie Spirituelle*, vol. V, pp. 459-480.

58. "*Il faut unir les deux méthodes: inductive et déductive, analytique et synthétique . . . telle est, croyons nous, la vraie méthode de la théologie ascétique et mystique.*" *Vie Spirituelle*, 1919, p. 18.

59. "*Saint Thomas fait ce travail documentaire en se servant des procédés de recherche historique tels qu'ils étaient en usage de son temps, tandis qu'aujourd'hui ces procédés se sont immensément développés et perfectionnés,* *Revue*, p. 16.

60. The terminology itself is still in a period of tentative definitions. To the urgent need of an understanding among theologians about the value of the terms of mystical theology attention has recently been directed by Garrigou-Lagrange (*Vie Spirituelle*, November 1921) who points out that not even such general and fundamental terms as '*contemplatio acquisita,*' '*contemplatio infusa,*' are taken in the same meaning by the various modern writers on asceticism. This necessity for methodical purposes of a series of definitions is recognized by J. Guibert (*Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*, April 1922), who endeavors to begin the work by submitting certain defi-

nitions for debate: "*Trois définitions de théologie mystique: 1, Contemplation acquise et infuse; 2, L'ordinaire et l'extraordinaire dans la voie de la sainteté; 3, Appel éloigné ou prochain, suffisant ou efficace.*"

61. See the long review of this work by J. Guibert in *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*, 1920, pp. 177-182.

62. A. Tanquerey, '*Un plan de théologie ascétique et mystique,*' *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*; January 1921, pp. 22-36. This tentative plan aims only at providing a definite basis for discussion among theologians of a plan of ascetic theology, "*qui soit assez compréhensif pour embrasser toutes les questions de spiritualité, assez logique pour aller du plus connu au moins connu, assez psychologique pour suivre pas à pas les différentes étapes qui conduisent à la perfection*" (p. 22).

63. The only general history of Christian asceticism is that of the Protestant Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*, 1897, supplemented by the same author in his *Tugendlehre des Christentums geschichtlich dargestellt*, 1904. But both deal primarily with the external and institutional side of the history of asceticism.

64. The Benedictine Dom Festugière in his book, *La Liturgie Chrétienne*, 1913, made a strong indictment of the Jesuit cherished tradition. According to him, (a) Loyola in formulating his spiritual method took his inspiration from Protestant individualism and also from certain elements of Mohammedan Sufism, adapting both to the orthodox spirit of his teaching. The spiritual formation of Loyola's followers has been carried on in this individualistic spirit. (b) The method of meditation and ascetic practice introduced by Loyola broke the traditional method of private and public prayers in the Church: his is a military method alien to the old liturgical method. (c) This new method developed a strong sense of devotion to the Church and a high ideal of Christian life in the individual, but at the same time diminished the traditional value and importance of the liturgical life in the Church. (d) This depreciation of the liturgical life produced, and is still producing, a diminution in the idea of the value of the hierarchy and of the entire organization of the Church. Against all these assumptions the Jesuit *Civiltà Cattolica* of Rome protested vigorously in a series of sharp articles appearing in volumes III and IV of the year 1914.

65. No less important than the text of St. Gall is that of Angoulême, which has now been published by Dom P. Gagin, *Le Sacramentaire gélasien d'Angoulême, publié par la Société hist. et archéol. de la Charente*, 1918. A complete edition of the Gelasian Sacramentaries of the eighth century has been announced by the Benedictines of Farnborough in their collection, *Monumenta Ecclesiae Liturgica*, but has not appeared as yet.

66. On the interrelations between the Gelasian and Gregorian Sacramentaries in Carolingian times, see the recent article of M. Andrieu, '*À propos de quelques sacramentaires récemment édités,*' in *Revue des Sciences religieuses* (University of Strasbourg), April 1922, pp. 190-210.

NOTES

TEKNONYMY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

The term teknonymy is applied to the custom of naming a man after his son. It is unusual in Western Europe, where the name received at birth is rarely changed, but as a practice of primitive peoples it has long been known to anthropologists. Indeed the term is of anthropological devising, apparently invented by Tylor, the father of the craft, and duly noted in Sir James Frazer's great repertorium of anthropological data, *The Golden Bough*. But neither Frazer nor Tylor seems to have referred to the teknonymy of a civilized people, the Arabs, who have developed the system as fully as could well be done. Almost every Arab has a personal or direct name, the *ism*, and an indirect one, or surname, taken from his child, the *kunyah*. He may have a number of other names as well, derived from his tribe, his rank, a sobriquet, a common pseudonym, or a patronymic. But it is the name and *kunyah* that most closely correspond to the given, or Christian, name and the surname of Western Europe. This *kunyah* contains the *Abu*, 'father,' indispensable to all Western writers who seek to establish an oriental background for their stories, culminating in the literally preposterous 'Abou Ben Adhém' of Leigh Hunt's famous poem. As a matter of fact *kunyah* may mean 'patronymic,' but the *kunyah* that contains *Abu*, 'father of', is so much the most common that ordinarily, when the word *kunyah* is used, we think of the teknonymic system rather than the other.

The *kunyah* is the name of courtesy. No one but intimates or uninstructed would use the direct name. If a grown man has the misfortune to be childless, he is addressed as *Abu Abdullah*. In some cases the *kunyah* entirely displaces the proper name, even for men of capital importance. For example, the actual name of the first khalifa is quite unknown, even to tradition. He is simply *Abu Bakr*, 'Father of the Maiden,' that is, father of that one of Mohammed's wives who was not a widow when she married the prophet.

The origin and significance of the custom cannot be fully discussed here. Tylor and Frazer connect it, as they could hardly fail to do, with taboo and with marriage institutions. Doubtless a name-taboo of some sort is at the bottom of it. But the Arabs have a conscious, and, it must be confessed, absurdly simple rationale for it.

They assume that the *kunyah* is a mark of honor designed to indicate a man's social affiliation, whereby he is addressed as the head of a house and the founder of a family; all this is implied in *Abu*.

It may be noted at this point that most of the instances of teknonymy which Tylor and Frazer actually give are from Africa and Asia, and from points very close to, or quite within, regions of Mohammedan influence. While wishing to give full weight to the persistency of local customs in names, I do not think the possibility of influence from neighboring Arabic-speaking (or partially Arabic-speaking) centres has been sufficiently taken into account.¹

Sporadic instances of something like teknonymy occur in places where it certainly did not prevail as a custom. So on two occasions in the *Iliad* (ii, 260; iv, 354) Odysseus refers to himself as "Father of Telemachus." However, this may have been a personal whimsey of the most personal and whimsical of heroes.

Teknonymy is distinctly an Arab and not a general Semitic custom. Babylonian and Aramaic names are for the most part composite names of various origin; frequently enough they are patronymics, but, except perhaps in Ethiopic, a *kunyah* in the restricted sense does not occur, certainly is not a regular portion of the name.

Now in the Old Testament the names are in general made on the Babylonian system. Patronymics are frequent and most names are theophorous, — as are also most Egyptian names. In a country lying, as Palestine does, directly between the Egyptian and Mesopotamian culture-areas, this is to be expected. But Palestine, continuous as was the development of its civilization, frequently suffered in historic times from invasions of Bedouin. The Old Testament is the literature of a group which professed to be descended from one of the more recent waves of Bedouin invaders. The modern counterparts of the Bedouin have an elaborate teknonymy, which goes through their entire literature as far as we can trace it. I wish in the present paper to suggest that we may find traces of teknonymy among those older Arabs, or quasi-arabs, whom we call Hebrews.

The thirtieth chapter of Proverbs contains "the words of Agur b. Yakeh." The collection in its present form is later than the rest of Proverbs, and has no internal bond with anything that goes before or after it. Agur speaks of the limitation of man's knowledge on mat-

¹ In Steinmetz's *Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe*, II, 223 seq, 'Teknonomie' is fully discussed, and, as might be supposed, brought into connection with the matriarchate. The presence of teknonymy among the Arabs is adverted to, but is treated as though it were a local custom in a restricted part of Syria.

ters concerning God. "Who hath ascended up into heaven or descended? Who hath gathered the wind in his fists? Who hath bound the waters in a garment? . . . What is his name, and what is his son's name, if thou knowest?" מה שמו ומה שם בנו. This is generally taken to be an announcement of the inscrutability of God, somewhat parallel to the Yahveh speeches in Job. Whether that is so or not — and the meaning that would be first suggested is, I think, a very different one — the ordinary interpretation of the passage as it appears in current commentaries is unsatisfactory. If, however, the *kunyah* was known to the Hebrews, the passage at once becomes intelligible. It is as though Agur asked, 'What is his name and surname?' If he is speaking of God, his tone is that of stern mockery of those who might profess to know the unknowable. If he is simply asserting that an individual who could really know the structure of the world must have direct acquaintance with all its phenomena, he ends by asking, 'Is there such a person? If you know him, pray give me his full name.'

Who is this Agur? The text immediately after his name contains a word which might be a place-name, Massa, and if so, Agur comes from the southern desert, Edom, and is not a Canaanite but a tribesman of the desert. That he is famous for wisdom is in keeping with the traditional repute of Edomites: Job came from Uz, and Teman was thick with wise men. The name Agur does not occur elsewhere in the Bible. It has a foreign ring.

Those who first wrote and read the collection of Agur understood the words, I think, in the way I have suggested. That might simply mean that they knew that the Edomites had such a custom, just as we know the Arabs have it. But we may remember that by a persistent tradition Edom — although in fact hostile — was a close kinsman of Israel, while the Canaanites among whom Israel lived and whose culture it absorbed were by an equally strong tradition originally utter aliens. Can we find, in records that Israelites regarded as indubitably theirs, traces of the practice we are considering?

In the story of Noah in Genesis 9, 18 the statement is made, "And the sons of Noah that went forth from the ark were Shem and Ham and Japheth, and Ham is the father of Canaan." And in verse 22 of the same chapter, Ham is again called 'Father of Canaan' אבי כנען. The passage is a part of the Yahvist document, the oldest of the component parts of the hexateuch, and contains fragments of a still older poem cursing Canaan. The usual explanation is that the older tradition gave the names of the three sons of Noah as Shem, Japheth,

and Canaan, and that a reviser inserted 'Ham the father of' before the name of Canaan in order to harmonize this tradition with the other according to which the three sons were Shem, Ham, and Japheth. That certainly is possible. But we do not know in its entirety the poem quoted, and the hypothesis of a reviser to make this insertion is unnecessary if we assume that in legends or ballads known to the Yahvist the ancient patriarch appeared with name and surname, *ism* and *kunyah*, Ham Abi C'naan.

Again in Genesis 11, 29 — a Yahvist passage — Abraham's niece and sister-in-law is called "Milcah, the daughter of Haran, the father of Milcah and Iscah." Iscah is unknown elsewhere, but Milcah is frequently mentioned and seems to be the eponymous mother of an important clan or tribe. What shall be said of such a phrase as "Milcah, the daughter of Haran, the father of Milcah," unless Father-of-Milcah (*Abi Milcah*) was practically Haran's surname, his *kunyah*? This would be in complete accordance with Arabic custom, where such an expression as Ismail ibn Abu-Ismail, is of frequent occurrence, although in it the actual name of Ismail's father is not mentioned at all.

So, too, in Genesis 30, 19 and 34, 6 the Canaanite prince referred to is called *Hamor Abi Sh'chem*, Hamor the father of Shechem. That same expression occurs in Judges 9, 28, in what is very likely a fragment of an old ballad or epic.

There are other cases which might be cited, *Kemuel Abi Aram* in Genesis 22, 21, *Arba Abi Anak*, Joshua 15, 13, *Machir Abi Gilead*, Joshua 17, 1; 1 Chronicles 2, 21-23. In 1 Samuel 14, 51 we have an expression like an Arabic name with a double *kunyah*, a very common case, *Ner Abi Abner ben Abiel* — the *Abi kunyah*, we may notice, coming first, as it would in Arabic.

Now the ordinary use of the *kunyah* in Arabic is not merely to denote physical paternity. It is the source of nicknames, both jocular and respectful. A man may be called 'Father of spectacles,' 'Father of strength,' 'Father of cunning.' More rarely 'Mother,' 'Sister,' or 'Brother' may be so used. Animals may be similarly honored. Indeed 'father of ravening' is a constant name for the lion, 'father of Job' (i.e. 'patience') for the camel. These terms of relationship mean merely that the particular quality is possessed in a striking degree by the person or animal mentioned. And this is not a late development but apparently is as old as anything we have of Arabic literature. In Hebrew there are a great many names of the form *Abitub*, *Abimelech*, *Abiezer*, *Achitub*, *Achimelech*, etc. The parts *Abi-* and

Achi-, 'father' and 'brother,' are most frequently taken to be the divine element of a theophorous compound — a substitute for *El*- or *Jeho*- or *Baal*-, and many suggestions have been offered as to who the god is that hides behind the innocuous appellation of Father or Brother. That, of course, implies that these names are a survival of a pre-yahvist period of Israelitish history. In some or all of these cases the explanation may be sound, although the designation of a god as 'brother' is, to say the least, difficult to parallel elsewhere. Secondly, while the *Abi* and *Achi* series show many correspondences, there are few cases in which an *Abi*-name appears in another form with *El*- or *Jeho*- in the place of *Abi*-, as *Abinadab* by the side of *Jehonadab*, and *Abiezer* parallel to *Eliezer*. In many of the names of this composition the second part is a quality or an action — help, strength, goodness. If in these names *Abi*- represents the Arabic type mentioned, as *Abu Thaqif*, *Abu Jamil*, and the like, we may find another case of the presence of a *kunyah*. *Abigail* and *Abishag*, which are names of women, will be hard to put into such a group, but there is nothing to hinder us from supposing that this type was derived from two sources — one the theophorous name and the other the *kunyah*.

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AN UNKNOWN SOURCE OF LUTHER'S THEOLOGY

In his article 'A Decade of Luther Study' (*Harvard Theological Review* for April 1921, p. 111), Preserved Smith says of A. V. Müller: "His own thesis, doubtless carried too far, is that everything in Luther can be found in his predecessors, and that there is practically nothing original at all in the Reformer's thought."

In two articles, to which Preserved Smith does not refer, Müller has collected concrete evidence in support of his view.¹ He there compares the theology of two members of Luther's order (the Augustinian) with that of Luther, showing that there is a perfect agreement on many important points between Agostino Favaroni and Jacobus Perez on the one hand, and Luther on the other.

But even more telling is the evidence brought in Müller's recent book,² in which we become acquainted with a nearly forgotten master

¹ *Bilychnis*, Rome, June 1914 and May-June 1920.

² A. V. Müller, *Una fonte ignota del sistema di Lutero (il beato Fidati da Cascia e la sua teologia)*. Rome, 1921.

of mediaeval theology, Fra Simone Fidati da Cascia,³ a member of the Augustinian order who died in 1348 after a life devoted to the preaching of the gospel.

His great work in fifteen books, which he wrote toward the end of his life, is quoted under various titles: *De gestis domini salvatoris*, or *Super totum corpus evangeliorum*, or *De religione christiana*. It was printed in at least three editions before the publication of Luther's thesis, namely, in 1485 (place unknown), in 1490 at Strassburg, and in 1517 at Basel.

Luther was no friend of philosophical studies. His opposition to Aristotle in theological matters was absolute. To the scholastic saying, "*Sine Aristotele non fit theologus*," he opposed his "*Theologus non fit nisi sine Aristotele*." This anathema against the "*rancidae logicorum regulae*" is found before Luther in Fidati, who condemns the doctors "mixing nature with supernatural theology" (viii. 22), "correcting with syllogisms the speech of Christ, the apostles, and the true doctors" (*ibid.*), and who doubts whether these *novi theologi*, claiming to be Catholic, were actually so in their hearts. To the *credo ut intelligam* he opposes *intelligo ut credam*.

Both Luther and Fidati opposed the scholastic doctrines enumerated below, although no one ever brought under suspicion the orthodoxy of Fidati.

(1) Fidati, in commenting upon "*poenitentiam agite*" (Matt. 4, 17), opposes the scholastic tripartition of penance (*contritio, confessio, satisfactio*) and refuses to admit that the latter two are essential elements of it. *Poenitentia* to him is the distressing sorrow of a soul separated from God; actions are merely the *signs* of penitence (ix. 7).

(2) To the common belief that human actions may be meritorious in the sight of God and helpful in obtaining salvation, Fidati opposes the great Pauline statement: "Only faith in Christ justifies and saves" (ix. 31); this faith is "a gift" (i. 23), which "only God operates in human hearts" (xi. 12). Fidati's position on the great question of salvation by works is that of the Reformation: "If salvation came from good works, Christ would have been crucified in vain, and grace would not be grace if our own justice could justify us" (i. 26). The basic principle of Protestantism could not be stated more clearly.

(3) "*Tu es Petrus et super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam*." In spite of the early Fathers, scholasticism had adopted the Roman interpretation of that passage; but Fidati, as explicitly as Luther,

³ See Mattioli, *Il beato Simone da Cascia*. Rome, 1898.

declares that the foundation stone is Christ: "We are namely founded not on Peter, but on the rock, Christ" (ix. 35).

(4) The efficiency of the intercession of the saints in favor of sinners is flatly denied by Fidati (xii. 15): they can help neither through their power nor through their merits: "*totum agitur in nomine salvatoris.*"

As to the question whether Luther used Fidati's book positive proof is not forthcoming, since Luther rarely quoted the sources of his thought. The value of Müller's work is rather in giving new support for the contention that Luther's ideas were not wholly new, that something of them was in the atmosphere. There was some light before sunrise, "*splendori antelucani,*" as Dante says. Fidati belonged to the elect company of those seers who to the call, "Watchman, what of the night?" answer, "The morning cometh."

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MACLER'S ARMENIAN GOSPELS

Le texte arménien de l'évangile d'après Matthieu et Marc par Frédéric Macler. Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliothèque des études, tome 28, Paris, 1919, pp. lxxii + 647.

The well-known Armenist of the École Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes at Paris, Professor Frédéric Macler, has laid New Testament scholars and those who are interested in the Caucasian languages, more particularly Armenian, under a decided obligation by the publication of this elaborate study of the text of Matthew and Mark in the Armenian version. What makes the book of especial value is the fact that we have here a large number of variants drawn from Mss. which were inaccessible to the editor of the only variorum edition of the Armenian text hitherto published — that of Zohrab, Venice, 1805. This is peculiarly grateful to the Armenist, while the New Testament critic finds a large body of readings from various Armenian Mss. or manuscript groups collected, translated, analyzed, and compared with the Greek, the Old Syriac, and the Peshitto by a competent scholar.

Macler, however, is not content with giving the raw materials, but marshals the evidence with considerable skill in support of certain theses which he is maintaining. A short outline of the book will

make this clear. After the introductory material and bibliography comes an historical introduction in two chapters, of which the first is entitled, 'Données historiques sur la question chez les auteurs arméniens anciens,' wherein are discussed (pp. xxvii-xxxiv) the statements by Koriun, Lazar of P'arp, Moses of Khorene, and the so-called 'little' Koriun. Macler concludes that the Scriptures were translated from the Greek by Sahak or Mashtots, and that the later tradition regarding Syrian activities in Moses of Khorene is incorrect. In the second chapter, 'Le problème envisagé par les modernes' (pp. xxxiv-lxxii), he discusses the views of other scholars, incidentally controverting Armitage Robinson's statements in his *Euthaliana*.

The Mss. themselves fall into two main groups, which Macler calls Z and Mq. To the group Z, which in the main reproduce Zohrab's text, belong: M (A.D. 902?), Venice, Mekh. 1144; E (A.D. 989), Echmiadzin 229¹; B (A.D. 1053), Echmiadzin 363; D (A.D. 1066), Echmiadzin 369; F (A.D. 1099), Echmiadzin 257. Apparently these all go back to the same archetype. The Mss. of the group Mq are made up of the following: Mq itself (A.D. 887), Lazarev Institute, Moscow; A (A.D. 1045), Echmiadzin 23 G; H (A.D. 1007), Venice, Mekh. 887; C (A.D. 1057), Echmiadzin 362 G. F seems to bear some relation to the Mq group.

Macler takes up the Mss., discussing the variants by categories. Mq is first treated (pp. 2-47), and the author comes to the conclusion that, although inaccurate, it contains good readings and is synthetic in character rather than representing any one actual type (p. 47). H (pp. 47-57) seems to be an inaccurate copy of a Ms. of the Mq type, but revised to bring it nearer the Greek. A contains, beside a number of errors, many "arbitrary" readings (pp. 57-93). C shows many dialectical and grammatical variations, as well as "arbitrary" readings: it stands close to A, and its language bears some relation to the grecophil school of translators (pp. 93-165). Macler's conclusion is that the Mq group has no inner unity, but that the variants which we meet in it go back to various types of Greek Mss., and he denies almost completely the notion of Syriac influence. The Mss. of the Z group, on the contrary, prove to be relatively closely related to one another, as far as M, B, D, and E are concerned (pp. 168-270); F seems to stand between Z and Mq (pp. 271-315).

The second part of the work consists of a comparison of the Armenian text with the other versions (pp. 317-402), first of all with

¹ This Ms. is described by Macler in *Nouvelles archives des missions scientifiques*, n. s., fasc. 2, Paris, 1910, pp. 27-37.

the Old Latin, where there is naturally but little agreement. Next comes the question of Syriac influence, and a discussion of the coincidences and disagreements between Z and the Peshitto. Before showing that the Evangelion da-Mepharreshe cannot be the original of the Armenian translation, he discusses the Peshitto, and endeavors to explain away the coincidences by adducing variants from various Greek Mss. The chapter (pp. 403-568) entitled 'La technique de la traduction,' is particularly interesting. Macler's thesis is that the Armenian "semble calqué sur la grec."

The final fourth chapter, "Examen des variants portant sur le fond" (pp. 569-637), is devoted to a discussion of the type of Greek Ms. to which the archetype of our Armenian codices is most closely related. Macler comes to the conclusion (p. 631) that 'la traduction arménienne repose sur un manuscrit grec de la famille que von Soden désigne par I: ce manuscrit est apparenté en particulier au Codex Bezae et à l'Évangile de Koridethi,' although he qualifies this statement by admitting that certain of the peculiarities of D are not found in the Armenian. After touching on the disagreement of the Armenian with both the Syriac and the Greek (pp. 632-637), he discusses the variant *dalmaterēn*, 'in Dalmatian' (Lc. 23, 38; Jo. 19, 20) for *γράμμασιν* . . . *ῥωμαϊκοῖς*, which he considers to be evidence that the Armenian Gospels were translated in the time of Justinian, the most important Byzantine emperor from Dalmatia.

The reviewer of this painstaking and careful work cannot but express his regret that (apart from the grave blemish of the lack of an index) certain omissions and commissions materially diminish its value. First of all, it is a great pity that complete collations of the several Mss. are not given. The reader is not put in a position to form his own judgment, but is forced to deal with the author's collections, themselves made to illustrate a theory. Secondly, the author is bound by the prevailing superstition that the oldest and calligraphically most perfect Mss. exhibit the best text. Éditions de luxe are objects of dubious value, and the elegant scribe is rarely a good scholar. Failure to recognize this has done incalculable harm to textual criticism, both of the biblical text and in classical philology. One has only to grasp the relation of Codex B in some books of the Bible to its minuscule congeners to see how often the latter have the true reading, while the uncial Mss. of Vergil stand far behind the better minuscules in value. Mq in particular is a very inaccurate Ms. Moreover, although the discussion of the various authorities

² R. Duval, *La littérature syriaque*,³ Paris 1907, pp. 37-42.

is valuable as a collection of opinions, the critical estimates are in many cases crude. The writer seems to give more weight to the *consensus opinionum multorum* than to the actual critical value of the remarks themselves, which for the most part is almost nil: the New Testament scholars are generally unacquainted with Armenian, while the Armenists are almost all wholly ignorant of the principles of New Testament criticism. As to the Armenian tradition about the translation itself, it seems to the reviewer highly unsafe to cast overboard the Syriac tradition as we have it in Moses of Khorene and to adhere to the violently partisan statements of such rabid grecophils as Lazar of P'arp and Koriun. Macler has not given due weight to the fact that the truthfulness of Moses of Khorene has of late been rehabilitated; if he cites Carrière, why not also Marr's work? The fact that Moses of Khorene is later than the other writers does not militate against the value of the sources which he used. A further very serious gap in the book lies in the fact that the Georgian tradition, which gives us the oldest accessible form of the Armenian text, is not used by the writer, when V. N. Beneševič's edition (St. Petersburg, 1909-11) must surely have been accessible to him. This is based on the Opiza gospels (A.D. 913). Still more important are the Adysh gospels, now published in a magnificent phototypic edition by E. S. Taqaishvili.³ This Ms. dates from the year 897, and the text seems quite independent of the Greek.

The view seems highly doubtful that our Armenian Mss. actually descend from a single archetype, and that it is possible to recognize this among existing Greek Mss. An examination of the evidence regarding the Armenian translators will show, I think, that Sahak was engaged in an opposition to Syriac translators. We know that up to the beginning of the fifth century the Diatessaron was the prevailing gospel text in use among the Mesopotamian Syrians, but that Rab-bula's revision met with an immediate success with all parties;⁴ it is not, then, likely that the Syriac missionaries would at once translate the gospels into Armenian? We have evidence from Georgian sources⁵ of the activity of the Nestorian translators in the fifth century.

³ Материалы по археологии Кавказа, выпускъ 16, Moscow, 1916. The date of the Ms. is disputed, but the preponderance of evidence for the earlier date as given in the text is very decided.

⁴ See F. C. Burkitt in *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe*, II, pp. 161-164, Cambridge, 1904.

⁵ See the tractate of the Georgian Katalikozi Arseni on the schism between Armenians and Georgians in *Žordania*, Kronikebi, etc., I. Tiflis, 1892, pp. 313 ff., especially p. 325.

Caucasian problems are complicated, and Caucasian languages are not bound by a classical tradition as was Greek. The processes of retranslation and revision went on almost uninterruptedly. Surely the history of the multiform versions of the Scriptures in Syriac and Georgian should be a warning against an undue simplification of the problem in Armenian. Then, too, the earlier history of the Koridethi Ms. is highly problematical, especially its localization at Martyropolis,⁶ nor is there the slightest evidence to connect Codex Bezae with Asia Minor. The *dalmaterēn* of Luke 23, 38, John 19, 20 is curious indeed, but we should note that there is no canonical translation or transliteration for the word 'Latin' in the Oriental languages. In some old Georgian texts we have for 'Roman' the form *p'romini*, which is so far an absolute enigma.⁷ That Justinian was reigning in Constantinople would hardly have caused Latin to be called 'Dalmatian' on the Armenian border. It is far more probably due to the fact of Dalmatian troops being stationed there for a considerable period.⁸ A reading of this sort need not point to exceptionally good knowledge of things imperial on the part of the translator, nor is the possibility excluded that the reading, after being once established in the text, was taken over by Mss. of a different version.

In fine, there are many serious objections to Professor Macler's arguments. He makes out a good case for the absence of any direct connection between the Old Syriac and the Armenian, and also for the preponderance of Greek influence in the gospel text, but he can only explain the numerous coincidences between it and the Peshitto by scraping together variants from many diverse types of Greek Mss. Would not the more natural supposition be that a translation from the Syriac formerly existed and has influenced our present text?

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⁶ This word is a very problematical expansion of an obscure contraction, nor is *Τεφρικη* certain either. See the text of the adscription, p. 498, and Beermann's discussion of the same, pp. 569 ff. in Beermann and Gregory's edition, Leipzig, 1913.

⁷ This form is found in the Georgian version of Epiphanius, *περὶ τῶν εἰς' ἡθῶν*, Ms. 1141 (ca. A.D. 970) of the Georgian Literary Society (Šatberd Ms.) p. 129a = ed. Джанашивили, p. 26; in the Passio ss. martt. Ivlianos et Evbulos, Tevdoros et Malkamon, Mokimen et Salamone, Ms. 341 (inc. aetatis) of the Georgian Society of History and Ethnology, f. 209r; in Acts 16, 21 of Ms. 407 of the Georgian Literary Society, quaternio 30, f. 2r (236).

⁸ Cf. V. Chapot, *La frontière de l'Euphrate de Pompée à la conquête arabe*, Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et Rome, fasc. 99, Paris, 1907, pp. 100-108.

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